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1The Origin of 






The principle that some governmental actions are 
permissible only if they promote a “compelling state interest,” 
and the doctrine of strict scrutiny of which it is an integral 
part, are among the most important and distinctive tenets and of 
modern constitutional law.1 They come into play, for example, 
whenever government employs a suspect classification, burdens a 
fundamental interest, or adopts a content-based regulation of 
speech.2 Yet, recent developments, stemming largely from 
affirmative action litigation, have led some commentators to 
 
* Distinguished Research Professor and Associate Dean for 
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on various drafts of this paper, I thank Robert Bennett, 
Mitchell Berman, Stephen Feldman, Catherine Fisk, David 
Franklin, Michael Klarman, Scot Powe, Spencer Waller, Mark 
Weber, Adam Winkler, and participants in the American Bar 
Foundation’s Chicago Legal History Seminar Series, DePaul 
University College of Law Faculty Workshop, and Northwestern 
University School of Law Legal Theory Colloquium.  I also thank 
the DePaul University College of Law Summer Research Program for 
its generous support. 
 1 See infra text accompanying notes 35-48 (discussing the 
three branches of strict scrutiny). 
 2 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1146 
(2005) (suspect classification); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 
205 (2003) (fundamental interest); Republican Party of Minnesota 
v. White, 536 U.S. 765 774-75 (2003) (content-based speech 
regulation); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles 
and Policies 645, 767, 902-03 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing various 
applications). 
2speculate about a fundamental shift in the compelling interest 
test’s and strict scrutiny’s underlying purpose and future 
direction.3 As a contribution to the debate, this Article traces 
the origin of the compelling state interest standard and strict 
scrutiny, seeking to clarify their history and the concerns that 
shaped their development. 
 
Conventional wisdom locates the origin of strict scrutiny 
and the compelling state interest test in equal protection 
litigation,4 tracing them initially to comments in Skinner v. 
Oklahoma5 and Korematsu v. United States6 and, after a hiatus of 
twenty years, to late Warren Court cases involving government 
 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 287-88 (discussing the 
cases and commentators).  The same developments have led some 
commentators to anticipate the doctrines’ wholesale demise.  
See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 481 (2004); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: 
Unlocking Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 Wm. & Mary 
Bill Rts. J., 65, 96-97 (2003); Calvin Massey, The New 
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, U. of Pa. J. of Const. 
L., 945, 970-80 (2004).  The predictions of fundamental changes 
in, and collapse of, strict scrutiny analysis trace back at 
least to Jeffrey Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming 
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161 
(1984).  Calls for sliding-scale, rather than tiered, review 
trace back to the 1970s.  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70, 98-99, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1146 (1987). 
 4 See, e.g., Melvin Urofsky, Division and Discord: The 
Supreme Court Under Stone and Vinson, 1941-53, at 89-90 (1997); 
Goldberg, supra note 3, at 496-503; Greg Robinson and Toni 
Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the 
Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 Law & Contemp. Problems 29, 30-39 
(2005); Larry Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions:  
A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban against Racial 
Discrimination, 15 San Diego L. Rev., 1041, 1068 (1978) (saying 
strict scrutiny developed in cases challenging segregation). 
 5 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 6 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
3actions that employed suspect classifications or burdened 
fundamental interests.7
This Article locates the development of the compelling 
interest standard and strict scrutiny in a substantially 
different place: litigation over First Amendment freedoms, such 
as speech, religion, and association in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  Skinner and Korematsu are famous, among other reasons, 
for being the first cases to employ the terms “strict scrutiny”8
and “most rigid scrutiny.”9 But they did not employ the test 
itself or any element of it.10 
As other historians have recently pointed out,11 for a 
quarter of a century after Justice Stone indicated in United 
States v. Carolene Products12 that some constitutional interests 
 
7 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634 
(1969) (using the standard and tracing its development); id. at 
660-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (tracing development of the 
standard).  See also Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
213-18 (1995) (tracing development strict scrutiny analysis of 
federal statutes); E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 649, 668 
(treating Skinner and Korematsu as early strict scrutiny cases); 
Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & 
Publ Affairs 107, 147-48 (1975) (saying paradigmatic strict 
scrutiny cases involve “equal protection” disputes “in the 
racial context”). 
 8 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 9 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 10 See infra text accompanying notes 196-204; John Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 146 n. 38 
(1980) (saying Skinner failed rationality review); Michael 
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
Mich. L. Rev. 213, 232 (1991) (saying Korematsu used 
“rationality review”). 
 11 See, e.g., Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The 
Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern 
Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47 Political Res. Quart. 623, 
644-48 (1994); G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of 
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 
95 Mich. L. Rev. 299, 301-02 (1996). 
 12 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
4would receive “more searching judicial inquiry,”13 the locus of 
that “more exacting ... scrutiny”14 was the First Amendment, not 
equal protection.15 But unlike these historians, this Article 
discusses the operational doctrines through which the Court, in 
First Amendment litigation, effectuated what G. Edward White has 
called “bifurcated review.”16 
The compelling state interest standard was a comparatively 
late development in the evolution of bifurcated review.  
Although the compelling state interest test has roots that reach 
back to the 1940s,17 it first appeared in First Amendment 
litigation in the late 1950s.18 Its birthing process was not 
complete until 1963,19 at which time it coalesced with other 
doctrines20 to form modern strict scrutiny analysis.  It took 
another six years for all the component parts of strict scrutiny 
to migrate from the First Amendment to the Equal Protection 
 
13 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n. 4. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Gillman, supra note 11, at 644-48; Klarman, 
Interpretive, supra note 10, 232-35, 254-57 (saying that strict 
scrutiny in equal protection cases began in the mid-1960s);  
White, supra note 11, at 327-57 (discussing heightened scrutiny 
of First Amendment cases from the 1940s to the 1960s). 
 16 White, supra note 11, at 327 (discussing the Court’s 
“bifurcated review project,” which gives heightened protection 
to favored constitutional interests and minimal protection to 
all others). 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 199-214 (discussing 
Korematsu and Oyama); Stephen Siegel, The Death and Rebirth of 
the Clear and Present Danger Test (manuscript on file with the 
author). 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 69-94 (discussing 
appearance of the test). 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 145-89 (discussing the 
development of the test). 
 20 The other doctrines are “burden shifting” and “narrow 
tailoring.”  They are discussed infra text accompanying notes 
36-48. 
5Clause.  The compelling state interest standard was the last 
component to make the move.21 When it did, strict scrutiny 
rapidly blossomed into one of the late-twentieth century’s most 
fundamental constitutional doctrines.22 
Part I of this Article discusses the compelling state 
interest test and strict scrutiny analytically, situating them 
as one of many doctrines through which the Court gives 
heightened protection to favored constitutional interests.  Part 
II describes the compelling interest test’s and strict 
scrutiny’s origin in the First Amendment, while Part III 
recounts their slow and piecemeal spread to the Equal Protection 
Clause.  Part IV discusses the revised history for the light it 
sheds on strict scrutiny’s rationale, arguing that strict 
scrutiny began as a tool of cost-benefit analysis, not as a 
means to ferret out illicit governmental motive.  Part V 
concludes the Article by canvassing the revised history for the 
light it sheds on the Court’s shifting understanding of whether 
the Equal Protection Clause’s “core value”23 is the proscription 
of racial subordination or racial classification. 
 
I. Situating the Compelling State Interest Test 
 and Strict Scrutiny 
 
The compelling state interest test, and the doctrine of 
strict scrutiny of which it is a part, are only two of a host of 
techniques by which the Supreme Court, since the New Deal, has 
bifurcated judicial review into heightened protection for 
favored rights and minimal protection for the rest.  
 
21 See infra text accompanying note 237-77. 
 22 Indeed, after blossoming in the Equal Protection Clause, 
strict scrutiny returned to First Amendment jurisprudence with 
even greater vigor and centrality.  See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, 
supra note 2, at 902-04 (discussing the centrality of the 
distinction between “content-based” and “content-neutral” laws 
in First Amendment analysis); Edward Heck, Justice Brennan and 
Freedom of Expression Doctrine in the Burger Court, 24 San Diego 
L. Rev. 1153, 1177-80 (1986) (commenting on the increasing use 
of strict scrutiny in First Amendment analysis after 1975). 
 23 Reva Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over 
Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1505 (2004). 
6By “heightened protection,” I mean any rule, standard, or 
analytic approach that gives a constitutional right more 
security than the minimal protections of rationality review.24 
Strict scrutiny is just one form of heightened protection.  As 
is well appreciated, in addition to strict scrutiny, there are 
the doctrines of “intermediate scrutiny”25 and “minimal scrutiny 
with bite.”26 These doctrines increase the protection for 
 
24 On rationality review, see E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, 
at 651-53.  Rationality review upholds any governmental action 
that rationally promotes a legitimate purpose.  Rationality 
review is permissive because, at least since the New Deal, the 
legitimate ends of government are so boundless, and the Court is 
so deferential in ascribing legitimate purpose to governmental 
action, that few laws can be said to violate this standard.  
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Railway 
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949); E. 
Chemerinsky, supra, at 654-59. 
 
Still, it is important to note that there are limits and 
even rationality review may result in overturning sufficiently 
egregious government action.  At times, even a deferential court 
may conclude that government action had an illicit purpose.  A 
classic example is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), 
where the Court held that Alabama’s decision to change the 
boundaries of Tuskegee, Georgia “from a square to an uncouth 
twenty-eight-sided figure,” id. at 340, with the consequence of 
fencing out all but a handful of its African-American voters, 
was meant to exclude the voters because of their race.  When 
this happens, government action has run afoul the Constitution’s 
“valid purpose” requirement.  Under the valid purpose 
requirement government action is unconstitutional when the Court 
determines that the end it promotes is one of few ends that are 
denied to modern government. 
 25 On intermediate scrutiny, see E. Chemerinsky, supra note 
2, at 645, 723-38.  In intermediate scrutiny, the government has 
the burden of establishing that its actual purpose substantially 
promotes an important government interest. 
 26 Jeffrey Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion 
and Reality 104 (2001).  See also Robert Farrell, Successful 
Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from 1971 through 
Romer v. Evans, 32 Ind. L. Rev. 357, 361-63, 370 (1999) 
(discussing the concept); Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
7constitutional rights by subjecting governmental action to more 
intense judicial examination, but do so by employing standards 
that are different, and more forgiving, than strict scrutiny.27 
More importantly, the whole regime of varying the tiers of 
scrutiny is itself but one of the techniques by which the modern 
Court gives differential protection to constitutional norms.  
Most frequently, the Court gives heightened protection to 
favored constitutional values simply by adopting a stringent 
standard or rule to adjudicate cases burdening those values.  
The rule of New York Times v. Sullivan,28 for example, that 
government officials may sue for defamation only when the 
defamer acted “with reckless disregard of whether [his 
statement] was false or not”29 is a stringent standard that 
substantially protects freedom of speech.  But it protects 
speech through a metric that is entirely different from what is 
meant by strict scrutiny.30 
Beyond adopting stringent substantive rules, the Court 
occasionally strengthens the protection of favored 
constitutional norms by relaxing procedural requirements that 
limit the opportunity to assert them.  “Overbreadth” doctrine is 
an example of this approach.  “Overbreadth,” which allows facial 
challenges to statutes brought by individuals who are objecting 
to how the law applies to third parties,31 gives First Amendment 
 
Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (1972) (same).  The Court 
is never forthright about whether it is employing “minimal 
scrutiny with a bite” or the “valid purpose requirement.”  There 
will be no need to distinguish between them in this Article. 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 35-37 (discussing 
strict scrutiny’s standards).  Because of these alternative 
doctrines, not every instance of intensified scrutiny is an 
instance of “strict scrutiny.” 
 28 356 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 29 New York Times, 356 U.S. at 280. 
 30 A similar instance is Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964), which adopted the stringent rule of “one person, one 
vote” to protect voting rights). 
 31 See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 912-17 
(discussing overbreadth); Daniel Farber, The First Amendment 49-
53, 74-75 (2d ed. 2003) (same); Morton Horwitz, The Warren Court 
8liberties increased protections through means that are not at 
all related to strict scrutiny. 
 
In short, there are a variety of doctrines that give 
constitutional values heightened protection without employing 
the approach that has come to be known as “strict scrutiny.”32 
Indeed, the opinions that introduced the term “strict scrutiny” 
into constitutional discourse did not actually use it.33 In
Skinner v. Oklahoma, for example, Justice Douglas subjected a 
sterilization statute to heightened review.  But he did so 
through a non-deferential inquiry into whether the statute’s 
classifications actually had a rational basis, employing the 
form of review that today would be called “minimal scrutiny with 
bite.”34 
If strict scrutiny is but one of the approaches that give 
enhanced protection to constitutional rights, the compelling 
state interest standard is just one part of strict scrutiny 
analysis.  Strict scrutiny varies from ordinary scrutiny35 by 
imposing three hurdles on the government.  It shifts the burden 
of proof to the government;36 requires the government to pursue a 
 
and the Pursuit of Justice 71-75 (1998) (discussing overbreadth 
and facial challenges); Robert McKay, The Preference for 
Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev., 1182, 1217-18 (1959) (discussing 
“standing to sue”). 
 32 See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68-73 
(discussing a variety of techniques used in First Amendment 
litigation); McKay, supra note 31, at 1203-1222 (same). 
 33 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).  See 
also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“most 
rigid scrutiny”); infra notes 34, 196-204 (discussing Skinner
and Korematsu). 
 34 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 146 n. 38 (saying 
Skinner failed rational relation test). 
 35 Ordinary scrutiny, the form of analysis which 
deferentially reviews most governmental action, is minimal 
scrutiny.  Minimal scrutiny upholds all action that is a 
rational means to accomplish to a legitimate government purpose.  
See E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645-46. 
 36 See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645. 
9“compelling state interest;” and demands that the regulation 
promoting the compelling interest be “narrowly tailored.”37 
Shifting the burden of proof is an expression of strict 
scrutiny’s assumption that in certain situations the judiciary 
should not accord the normal presumption of constitutionality to 
government action.  The burden shifting aspect of strict 
scrutiny traces to the Supreme Court’s decision, in the late 
1930s, to accord governmental action that burdened First 
Amendment liberties a reduced presumption of constitutionality.38 
In 1958, the reduced presumption of constitutionality in First 
Amendment cases grew into full-fledged burden shifting.  In that 
year, Justice Brennan decided Speiser v. Randall39 by shifting 
the burden of proof to the government and justified doing so on 
the ground that, when facts are unclear, properly protecting 
First Amendment rights requires imposing the cost of erroneous 
conclusions on the government.40 A decade later, burden shifting 
migrated into equal protection cases.41 
37 See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645 
(discussing strict scrutiny). 
 38 See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 
n. 4 (1938) (citing First Amendment cases); McKay, supra note 
31, at 1212-13.  See also Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, 
at 234 (tracing the “inver[sion] of the ordinary presumption of 
constitutionality” in First Amendment cases to U.S. v. CIO, 335
U.S. 105, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 39 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 40 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 524-26 (1958).  See 
McKay, supra note 31, at 1221 (describing burden shifting as “a 
distinctively new variation of the [First Amendment’s] preferred 
position [that] was imaginatively supplied by Justice Brennan in 
Speiser v. Randall”).   
41 It is difficult to date precisely when burden shifting 
entered equal protection analysis.  The comment in Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) that racial 
classifications are “immediately suspect” and subject to “the 
most rigid scrutiny” certainly hints that racial classifications 
will be accorded less of a presumption of constitutionality.  
But the outcome of the case involved complete deference to, and 
not a demand for proof from, the government.  Perhaps the best 
evidence that burden shifting was not established in equal 
protection analysis until fairly late is that the Harvard Law 
Review’s classic note on Developments in the Law - Equal 
10
Strict scrutiny’s “narrow tailoring” requirement provides a 
means to examine the government’s “precision of regulation,”42 
allowing the Court to uphold government action “only if ... it 
is necessary to achieve ... [the] compelling interest” that the 
government has asserted as the purpose of its action.43 Narrow 
tailoring demands that the fit between the government’s action 
and its asserted purpose be “as perfect as practicable.”44 
Strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement means that 
legislation must be neither overinclusive nor underinclusive. 
 
Narrow tailoring is the oldest branch of strict scrutiny.45 
Tracing back to Gilded Age Commerce Clause adjudication, and 
frequently used in Lochner-era police power cases, the “narrow 
tailoring” doctrine gave meaningful protection to constitutional 
norms well before the development of either modern bifurcated 
 
Protection, published in March 1969, cited only a California 
Supreme Court case for the proposition that “the ordinary 
presumption of validity is reversed when a suspect 
classification is made.” Developments in the Law - Equal 
Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065, 1101 (1969) (citing Sei Fujii 
v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952). 
 
If, as the Harvard Editors seem to do, we equate cases that 
impose a heightened burden of justification with cases that 
shift the burden of proof, see id. (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967), then we may say that burden shifting 
entered equal protection analysis in 1964. 
 42 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
 43 E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645. 
 44 John Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 
933 n. 85 (1983).  See also J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 
146 (speaking of strict scrutiny’s “demand for an essentially 
perfect fit”). 
 45 On the history of narrow tailoring, see Guy Struve, The 
Less-Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 
80 Harv. L. Rev. 1463 (1967); Francis Wormuth and Harris Mirkin, 
The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah L. Rev 254 
(1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 
Yale L. J. 464 (1969). 
11
review or strict scrutiny.46 By 1940, the New Deal Court had 
made narrow tailoring analysis a prominent part of First 
Amendment jurisprudence.47 The Warren Court made it a part of 
equal protection analysis in 1964.48 
Thus the burden shifting and narrow tailoring branches of 
strict scrutiny analysis originated outside of strict scrutiny, 
and were vibrant facets of constitutional law and First 
Amendment jurisprudence before their appearance in equal 
protection litigation in the 1960s.  But what of the “compelling 
state interest” standard?  When and where did it originate?  And 
when and where did the three strands of strict scrutiny coalesce 
into that central doctrine of modern constitutional law? 
 
In answering these questions, this Article demonstrates 
that the compelling state interest standard and strict scrutiny 
originated not in the Equal Protection Clause’s racial 
discrimination cases, but in First Amendment litigation in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.  Rather than being the earliest area 
in which the compelling state interest standard appeared, racial 
classification cases were among the last. 
 
II. The Birth of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict 
Scrutiny 
 
The notion that government needs “a compelling state 
interest” to justify infringing of constitutionally protected 
 
46 See Wormuth and Mirkin, supra note 45, at 257-70 
(discussing the development of the doctrine). 
 47 Wormuth and Mirkin, supra note 45, at 271-77; infra text 
accompanying notes 298-302 (mentioning narrow tailoring as part 
of 1940s First Amendment jurisprudence).  For Wormuth’s and 
Mirkin’s complete discussion of narrow tailoring in First 
Amendment cases, see id. at 270-93. 
 48 See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964); id. 
at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Professors Tussman and 
tenBroek argue that narrow tailoring should be an important part 
of equal protection analysis but the absence of case citation 
shows that in 1949, when they wrote their seminal article, that 
development had not yet occurred.  See Joseph Tussman and 
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Cal. L. 
Rev. 341, 344-53 (1949) (discussing reasonable classification). 
12
values was established in First Amendment litigation in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.  In those years, immersed in Cold War 
fears, concerns about national security, and anti-communist 
hysteria,49 the Court was bitterly divided between Justices who 
favored quite modest protection50 of First Amendment values and 
Justices who favored robust protection.51 The low-protectionists 
were led by Justice Felix Frankfurter who had been advancing 
this position since the early 1940s.52 Justice John Marshall 
Harlan was so closely associated with this endeavor that, in 
First Amendment matters, contemporaries regarded him as 
“Frankfurter-lite.”53 Justices Clark, Stewart, and Whittaker 
composed the rest of the low-protectionist bloc.54 The high-
 
49 See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 
1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 247-49, 252, 258 
(1992); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 56-65, 67-68; 
Lucas Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics 75-103, 135-
56 (2000); Martin Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court 
and Judicial Review 108-11 (1966); Geoffrey Stone, Perilous 
Times: Free Speech in Wartime From the Sedition Act of 1798 to 
the War on Terrorism 330-419 (2004). 
 50 I will hereinafter refer to this group of Justices as 
low-protectionists. 
 51 I will hereinafter refer to this group of Justices as 
high-protectionists.  On the Court’s division into low- and 
high-protectionists, see M. Horwitz,  Warren, supra note 31, at 
62-65 (recounting First Amendment cases decided by a 5-4 vote); 
id. at 117 (Appendix) (listing the Court’s 4 liberal and 5 
conservative Justices); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 88-90. 
 52 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-96 (1949) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (disputing the First Amendment’s 
“preferred position”); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 
(1940); Wallace Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger – From 
Schenck to Dennis, 52 Columb. L. Rev. 313, 320 (1952); M. 
Urofsky, supra note 4, at 165-66; White, supra note 11, at 337-
40; Alpheus Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1838-1940:  Mr. 
Justice Stone and “Preferred Freedoms”, 65 Yale L.J. 597, 614-66 
(1956). 
 53 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 143. 
13
protectionist group consisted of Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.55 
As the low-protectionists were in the majority, their views 
predominated until 1962 when Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker 
retired for reasons of health.56 Whittaker and Frankfurter were 
replaced by Byron White and Arthur Goldberg.57 Because Goldberg 
consistently favored first amendment claimants,58 his appointment 
gave high-protectionists a reliable majority for the first time 
in Supreme Court history.59 It was Goldberg’s appointment that 
launched the First Amendment on its course of sustained growth 
that continues to this day.60 
Nonetheless, before Goldberg’s appointment, during the 
years in which low-protectionists composed the majority,61 the 
 
54 See, e.g., M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 117 
(Appendix) (listing the Court’s 5 conservative Justices).  
 55 See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 117 (Appendix) 
(listing the Court’s 4 liberal Justices); L. Powe, supra note 
49, at 88-90. 
 56 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 205, 209-10. 
 57 M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 63-66; L. Powe, 
supra note 49, at 210-12. 
 58 M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 65-66; L. Powe, 
supra note 49, at 211-12.  Justice White was not a consistent 
civil libertarian.  See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 
71, 117 (saying Justice White did not generally protect civil 
liberties and listing him among the Warren Court’s 
conservatives); L. Powe, supra, at 210-11, 304. 
 59 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 209-11, 303-35.  In the 
1940s, high-protectionists had a solid bloc of four Justices 
which, because they frequently attracted votes from the moderate 
center, prevailed in a wide-variety of cases.  They did not, 
however, have a majority.  See Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, 
at 320; Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at *.  
 60 See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 65-73; L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 209-16, 497-501. 
 61 The entire period of low-protectionist dominance dates 
from 1949 to 1962.  In the 1940s, high-protectionist had more 
14
Warren Court ruled against First Amendment claimants in many 
high profile cases.62 There were exceptions,63 of course, and in 
six cases, decided between 1957 and 1960, the state’s failure to 
assert a compelling interest was among the reasons given for why 
the First Amendment claimant should prevail.64 As the opinions 
 
influence, but they lost it when two of their numbers, Justices 
Murphy and Rutledge, died.  See Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at 
*. 
 62 See, e.g.,  McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
(upholding the enforcement of Sunday closing laws against 
Orthodox Jews);  In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (upholding 
denial of bar admission for refusing to answer questions about 
communist affiliation); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 
109 (1959) (upholding contempt of Congress conviction of college 
professor for refusing to answer HUAC questions); Lerner v. 
Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 477-79 (1958) (upholding firing a subway 
conductor for failure to answer questions about Communist Party 
membership); Bauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) 
(upholding group libel laws); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494 (1951) (upholding conviction of Communist Party leadership 
for conspiring to advocate the necessity of overthrowing the 
government); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 62-65 
(discussing the cases); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 135-56 
(same). 
 63 See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) 
(voiding statutes requiring that teachers reveal all 
organizations to which they belong or contribute); Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (voiding laws banning anonymous 
leafleting); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) 
(overturning Smith Act conviction of “second-tier” Communist 
Party officials); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) 
(overturning contempt of Congress conviction for refusing to 
answer HUAC questions when their pertinency was not explained to 
witness). 
 64 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 
(1960); Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Commitee on 
Law Reform and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344, 352 (1959); 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring).  The compelling interest standard was also set out 
in a dissent.  See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 
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in four of these cases were written by low-protectionists,65 who 
also set out the compelling interest standard in two cases in 
which they ruled against First Amendment claimants,66 the seminal 
appearances of the compelling interest standard in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence require close analysis to determine what the 
concept meant to the Justices who first used it. 
 
This section undertakes that analysis and concludes that 
the compelling state interest test, when employed by low-
protectionist Justices between 1957 and 1960, was not meant to 
be a stringent standard.  Moreover, it was in the process of 
being abandoned when Goldberg’s appointment turned majority 
control over to Justices who favored First Amendment values.  
Thus despite its appearance before Goldberg’s appointment, the 
compelling state interest standard was not established in the 
First Amendment until 1963.  In that year, it was used in three 
opinions written for a transformed Court by the high-
protectionist Justices Brennan and Goldberg.67 These opinions, 
which established the compelling state interest test and strict 
scrutiny as part of First Amendment jurisprudence, also 
announced the birth of what commentators have called “history’s 
Warren Court.”68 
(1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (using the 
compelling standard as the standard for his dissent). 
 65 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 66 (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(discussed infra note 115); Bates, 361 U.S. at 517 (discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 122-26); NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451 
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 120-224); Sweezy, 354 
U.S. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 69-94).  
 66 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959) 
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 106-12); Uphaus v. 
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 79-81 (1959) (discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 101-05). 
 67 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399, 403, 406 (1963) 
(discussed infra text accompanying notes 182-89); Gibson v. 
Florida Legislative Investigative Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 540, 
546 (1963) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 172-81); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 417, 438, 439 (1963) (discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 163-71).  
 68 See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 207.  See also id. at 
209-16, 497-501 (dating “history’s Warren Court” to the 1962 
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A.  First Mention of the Compelling State Interest Standard 
 
The notion that the government needs “a compelling state 
interest” to justify an infringement of constitutionally 
protected values first appeared in 1957 in Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurrence to Sweezy v. New Hampshire.69 In Sweezy, the Supreme 
Court overturned Paul Sweezy’s contempt conviction for refusing 
to answer questions put to him by New Hampshire’s Attorney 
General who was investigating subversive activities on behalf of 
the state legislature.70 Sweezy, who was a socialist and a 
professor at the University of New Hampshire, refused to answer 
questions about his classroom lectures and his involvement with 
the Progressive Party.71 
In deciding Sweezy, Chief Justice Warren announced the 
judgment of the Court and wrote for himself and Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Brennan – his fellow high-protectionists.  Warren’s 
opinion ultimately rested on narrow grounds:  that in 
questioning Sweezy, the Attorney General was acting beyond the 
legislature’s authorizing resolution.72 Leading into this part 
of his opinion, however, Warren touched on the case’s broader 
issues.  The case involved a college professor’s “right to 
lecture and his right to associate with others.”73 The state 
Supreme Court recognized this, but determined that Sweezy’s 
First Amendment rights were “outweighed” by the legislature’s 
interest in knowing whether “there exists a potential menace 
from those who would overthrow the government by force and 
 
Term); M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 10-12, 37-46, 65 
(noting the importance of Goldberg’s appointment but also 
indicating that outside of the First Amendment, a liberal 
majority did not “jell” until Thurgood Marshall’s appointment).   
 69 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).  Sweezy is 
insightfully discussed in L. Powe, supra note 49, at 97-98. 
 70 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 237. 
 71 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 238-44. 
 72 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 253-55. 
 73 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 249. 
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violence.”74 Responding to this balancing analysis, Warren 
suggested 
 
[w]e do not now conceive of any circumstance wherein a 
state interest would justify infringement of rights in 
these fields.  But we do not need to reach such fundamental 
questions of state power to decide this case.75 
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan made up the rest of the 
Sweezy majority.76 Although they agreed that Sweezy’s contempt 
conviction could not stand, as the Court’s leading deferential 
Justices they could not assent to any part of Warren’s 
rationale.  Frankfurter and Harlan thought that Warren’s narrow 
ground was essentially a matter of state law for which the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court’s contrary decision was binding.77 Nor
could they abide Warren’s hint of a non-deferential approach to 
the case’s broader First Amendment issues.78 Accordingly, 
Frankfurter, joined by Harlan, wrote a separate opinion that in 
many ways was a typical deferential balancing analysis.   
 
Frankfurter began by noting that in cases like Sweezy
[o]urs is the narrowly circumscribed but exceedingly 
difficult task of making the final judicial accommodation 
between the competing weighty claims that underlie all such 
questions of due process.79 
74 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251. 
 75 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 251. 
 76 Two other low-protectionist Justices, Clark and Burton, 
dissented.  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267-70 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
Justice Whittaker did not take part in the decision.  Id. at 
255. 
 77 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 257 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
See also id. at 268 (Clark, J., dissenting) (same). 
 78 Frankfurter and Harlan were the leading low-
protectionist Justices.  See supra text accompanying notes 52-
53. 
 79 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 256 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
Frankfurter’s emphasis in the quoted language on general due 
process, rather than the more specific First Amendment, should 
be noted.  It was part of his constant effort to liken free 
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The decision involved “balancing two contending principles – the 
right of a citizen to political privacy ... and the right of the 
State to self-protection.”  Striking the appropriate balance, he 
said, 
 
must not be an exercise of whim or will.  It must be an 
overriding judgment founded on something much deeper and 
more justifiable than personal preference.  As far as it 
lies within human limitations, it must be an impersonal 
judgment.  It must rest on fundamental presuppositions 
rooted in history to which widespread acceptance may fairly 
be attributed.  Such a judgment must be arrived at in the 
spirit of humility when it counters the judgment of the 
State’s highest court.80 
Yet, for a low-protectionist jurist, Frankfurter’s 
concurrence was unique in three respects.  First, Frankfurter 
composed what Professor Lucas Powe has aptly described as “the 
most powerful First Amendment defense of academic freedom in the 
United States Reports that exists to this day.”81 “For society’s 
good,” Frankfurter wrote, 
 
inquiries into [the physical and social sciences], 
speculations about them, stimulation in others of 
reflection, must be left as unfettered as possible.   
 
speech cases to review of economic regulations.  See M. Urofsky, 
supra note 4, at 21, 165-55; White, supra note 11, at 338-40. 
 80 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 81 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 97.  See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 
261-64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing the importance 
of academic freedom); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 
(2003) (drawing from Sweezy’s discussion of academic freedom); 
id. at 362 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in 
part) (same); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. System v. 
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237-38 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(same); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 835-36 (1995) (same); Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 
U.S. 183, 196-97 (1990) (same).  Even before Sweezy, Frankfurter 
had written at length about the importance of academic freedom, 
describing “teachers ... as the priests of our democracy” in 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
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These pages need not be burdened with proof ... of the 
dependence of a free society on free universities. This 
means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the 
intellectual life of a university. It matters little 
whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action 
that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness 
of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so 
indispensable for fruitful academic labor.82 
Second, Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence is unusual 
because, although the case involved the government’s security 
needs, Frankfurter ruled against the government, arguing that 
 
When weighed against the grave harm resulting from 
governmental intrusion into the academic life of a 
university, [the government’s] justification for compelling 
a witness to discuss the contents of his lecture appears 
grossly inadequate.83 
The final unique aspect of Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence 
is the reason Frankfurter thought the balance of conflicting 
interests favored Sweezy.  Frankfurter thought the balance of 
conflicting interests favored Sweezy because of the importance 
of academic freedom to a free society.  Due to academic 
freedom’s critical importance, Frankfurter asserted that the 
 
82 Sweezy, 354 U.S. 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
Frankfurter also quoted at length from a recent “poignant ... 
[but] unheeded” statement of South African scholars to the 
effect that  
 
[i]t is the business of a university to provide that 
atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, 
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there 
prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a university — to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, 
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study.  
 
Id. at 262-63 (quoting The Open Universities in South Africa 19-
12 (n.d.)). 
 83 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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state needed singularly important reasons for burdening it.84 As
Frankfurter put it: 
 
Political power must abstain from intrusion into this 
activity of freedom ... except for reasons that are exigent 
and obviously compelling.”85 
This is the first appearance of the “compelling state interest” 
test in Supreme Court precedent.86 
In light of Frankfurter’s usual devotion to deferential 
adjudication, it is hard to accept that Frankfurter meant what 
he wrote in Sweezy. Later in his opinion, he did pull back a 
bit.  When speaking of the Attorney General’s inquiries, not 
into Sweezy’s college lectures, but into his engagement with the 
Progressive Party, Frankfurter wrote: 
 
For a citizen to be made to forego even a part of so basic 
a liberty as his political autonomy, the subordinating 
interest of the State must be compelling.87 
In this latter context, “compelling” is less forceful as it is 
not conjoined with the term “exigent,” a term clearly indicating 
an urgent and pressing quality for the state interest. 
 
84 It is instructive to contrast Frankfurter’s concurrence 
with the dissent of Justices Clark and Minton.  In an opinion 
that was more typical of low-protectionists, those Justices 
simply said that they were 
 
not convinced that the State’s interest in investigating 
subversive activities for the protection of its citizens is 
outweighted by any necessity for the protection of Sweezy. 
 
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 270 (Clark, J., dissenting).  
 85 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262.  See also id. at 265 (quoted 
infra text accompanying note 87). 
 86 The phrase had been used on a few occasions in non-civil 
liberties contexts.  See New Jersey v. New York, 345 U.S. 369, 
373 (1953) (test for a city attempting to intervene in a suit 
brought by its state against another state); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 442 (1944) (test for summary action). 
 87 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265. 
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Nevertheless, Frankfurter probably did mean what he wrote 
in Sweezy, as uncharacteristic as his undeferential stance may 
be.  Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence was uncharacteristic in 
several regards, not just in the extensive protection it offered 
the “academic freedom” branch of First Amendment values.  
Frankfurter usually did not write passionate opinions.  He was 
the leading proponent of impersonal adjudication, something he 
called for in Sweezy itself.88 Yet, it is not too much to 
suggest that Frankfurter’s heightened standard for interest 
balancing in Sweezy, as well as his passion, reflected something 
highly personal:  that he was a former academic who gloried in 
that life and role.89 If so, the scope of Frankfurter’s 
heightened “exigent and obviously compelling” state interest 
test would be limited to academic freedom cases. 
 
It is also possible that Frankfurter was advancing 
something broader in Sweezy. Sweezy was handed down on June, 17 
1957, which quickly was dubbed “Red Monday” because the Court 
released four decisions that day severely restricting the 
government’s Cold War national security and loyalty programs.90 
In Sweezy, Frankfurter might have been drawing a constitutional 
line between advocates of communism and advocates of other left-
wing ideologies, such as the groups to which Paul Sweezy 
belonged.91 “In the political realm, as in the academic,” 
Frankfurter wrote, 
 
88 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 267 (quoted supra text accompanying 
note 80).  See also Ken Kersch, Construction Civil Liberties 86 
(2004) (saying Frankfurter called for decision according to 
“objective standards”). 
 89 Frankfurter, for example, always acted as a professor 
towards his fellow Justices, to their great annoyance.  See M. 
Urofsky, supra note 4, at 33-9 (discussing Frankfurter’s 
temperament and friction on the Court).  Religious freedom was 
another area that Frankfurter took personally and wrote 
impassioned opinions.  See People ex rel. McCollum v. Illinois, 
333 U.S. 203, 212-32 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); West 
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646-71 (1943) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 90 See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 59-62 
(discussing “Red Monday”); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 93-98 
(same). 
 91 Sweezy was a Marxist-socialist and a member of the 
Progressive Party.  Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 241-43.  
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thought and action are presumptively immune from 
inquisition by political authority. ... Until recently, no 
difference would have been entertained in regard to 
inquiries about a voter’s affiliations with one of the 
various so-called third parties that have had their day, or 
longer, in our political history. ... Whatever, on the 
basis of massive proof and in the light of history, of 
which this Court may well take judicial notice, be the 
justification for not regarding the Communist Party as a 
conventional political party, no such justification has 
been afforded in regard to the Progressive Party.  A 
foundation in fact and reason would have to be established 
far weightier than the intimations that appear in the 
record to warrant such a review of the Progressive Party.  
This precludes the questioning that [Sweezy] resisted in 
regard to that Party.92 
Read this way, the scope of Frankfurter’s 
uncharacteristically non-deferential concurrence in Sweezy was 
considerably broad.  It protected members of perhaps all 
disfavored political associations, with the singular exception 
of communists, who were viewed more as a paramilitary 
organization than as a political movement.93 This reading also 
meaningfully accounts for Frankfurter’s difference with Warren’s 
plurality opinion, which suggested stringent First Amendment 
protection even for members of the Communist Party.94 
B. Second Thoughts About the Compelling State 
Interest Test  
 
Whatever Frankfurter meant by Sweezy’s “exigent and 
obviously compelling” state interest standard, he and Justice 
Harlan (who had joined the Sweezy concurrence) quickly reverted 
to their low-protectionist, deferential-balancing approach.95 
92 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266. 
 93 See, e.g., Dennis v. U.S., 341 U.S. 494, 577 (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
 94 See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 98; supra text 
accompanying note 75 (quoting Warren’s absolutist rhetoric in 
Sweezy). 
 95 Cases in which the Court defended the NAACP against 
attack by southern legislatures form a temporary exception to 
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The Court’s four “Red Monday” decisions, along with its race and 
criminal procedure decisions, provoked an uproar in Congress.96 
In 1958, Congress considered, and came very close to passing, a 
host of anti-Court bills, including one that would strip the 
Court of its appellate jurisdiction in domestic security cases.97 
As Professor Powe recounts: 
 
The anti-Court bills caused Frankfurter to get religion 
again. ... Frankfurter interpreted ... Congress as having 
questioned whether an independent judiciary might be too 
high a price to pay when the cost was the eradication of 
the loyalty-security programs.  Thus, one of the two would 
have to give way .... Frankfurter was ready to save the 
Court; prudence dictated the Court yield in this area.  His 
dalliance with the four liberals ... was over.98 
Frankfurter’s and Harlan’s reversion to the “government 
action is constitutional if it is reasonable”99 standard was 
first manifested in a pair of 1958 cases involving public 
employees who relied on the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer 
questions about Communist Party membership.100 By 1959, their 
 
this statement.  See infra text accompanying notes 119-26 
(discussing the cases). 
 96 See M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 64-65; L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 127-35. 
 97 Walter Murphy, Congress and the Court 127-223 (1962); L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 127-35; C. Herman Pritchett, Congress 
Versus the Supreme Court 1957-1960 at 107-16 (1961); William 
Ross, Attacks on the Warren Court by State Officials, 50 Buffalo 
483, 497-507 (2002). 
 98 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 141-42.  See also Michael 
Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and 
the Struggle for Racial Equality 334-35 (2004) (discussing the 
Court’s retrenchment on civil rights). 
 99 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 142.  See also M. Horwitz, 
Warren, supra note 31, at 62-64 (recounting the Court’s 
“retreat”). 
 100 See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 137-38 (discussing 
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) and Beilan v. Bd. of 
Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958)). 
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reversion to deferential analysis had spread to cases involving 
private citizens who premised their refusal to respond to 
questions posed by legislative investigating committees on the 
First Amendment. 
 
The first of the 1959 decisions, Uphaus v. Wyman,101 
involved a camp director who refused to divulge the list of 
speakers who had given talks at his leftist summer camp.102 
Writing for a five Justice majority that included Justices 
Frankfurter and Harlan, Justice Clark said “we have for decision 
the ... question of whether the public interests overbalance 
[the] conflicting private ones.”103 After noting that “the 
academic and political freedoms discussed in Sweezy ... are not 
present here in the same degree, since [the camp] is neither a 
university nor a political party,”104 Clark easily found that the 
governmental interest in “learn[ing] if subversive persons were 
in the State .... is sufficiently compelling to subordinate the 
interest in associational privacy.”105 
Uphaus’s “sufficiently compelling” state interest 
requirement said nothing about the quantum of the weight 
required for the state to override First Amendment rights.  As 
used in Uphaus, the compelling interest standard meant only that 
to override First Amendment freedoms the state had to assert an 
interest that was important enough under circumstances.  
Uphaus’s “sufficiently compelling” standard was a tautology 
requiring nothing more than that, on balance, the state interest 
outweigh the private interest. 
 
101 360 U.S. 72 (1959). 
 102 Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 73-75. 
 103 Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 78. 
 104 Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 77. 
 105 Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 79-81.  Clark approvingly cited 
Dennis v. United States, 314 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).  Clark 
reasoned that determining the presence of subversive persons 
implicated the state’s “interest of self-preservation.”  Uphaus, 
360 U.S. at 80. 
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The other decision, Barenblatt v. United States,106 involved 
a college professor who refused to answer questions about 
membership in the Communist Party and Communist-front clubs when 
he was called before the House Un-American Activities 
Committee.107 After setting out a balancing of interests 
approach to the issues,108 and noting that in First Amendment 
cases the “subordinating interest of the State must be 
compelling,”109 Justice Harlan ruled (on behalf of the same five 
Justice majority that had decided Uphaus) that Barenblatt’s 
contempt conviction was “beyond question.”110 Despite Harlan’s 
use of Sweezy’s “compelling interest” rubric, commentators 
immediately began critically analyzing Harlan’s opinion as a 
paradigmatic example of the Cold War Court’s highly deferential 
approach to First Amendment disputes.111 These commentators 
recognized that Harlan was using the “compelling interest” 
 
106 360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
 107 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 114. 
 108 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126-27. 
 109 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 127 (quoting Sweezy; internal 
quotation marks removed). 
 110 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 133. 
 111 M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68; L. Powe, 
supra note 49, at 144-45; M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 83-87; 
Samuel Krislov, The Supreme Court in the Political Process 115-
16 (1965); Laurent Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 
71 Yale L.J. 1424, 1438-40, 1443-44 (1962); Melville Nimmer, The 
Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Cal. L. Rev. 935, 
939-41 (1968); Charles Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living 
Constitution, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 673, 718-20 (1963); Edmund Cahn, 
The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 Yale L.J. 464, 479-80 
(1956) (describing deferential Justices as “laissez-faire 
jurists”); Frank Strong, Fifty Years of Clear and Present 
Danger: From Schenck to Brandenburg – and Beyond, 1969 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 41, 57-59 (discussing the contemporary criticism); Siegel, 
Death, supra note 17, at * (on file with the author).  Scholarly 
attention followed, in part, Justice Black’s forceful dissent.  
See Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 143-62 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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standard as it had been defined in Uphaus, the case with which 
Barenblatt was argued and decided.112 
After Uphaus and Barenblatt, the deferential majority 
decided case after case employing a balancing analysis without 
mentioning a requirement for the state to have a “compelling” 
interest.113 Justice Harlan, for example, writing for the Court 
in Koningberg v. State Bar of California,114 spoke of laws 
burdening First Amendment rights as permissible simply “when 
they have been found justified by subordinating valid 
governmental interests.”115 As far as the deferential majority 
was concerned, Sweezy’s “exigent and obviously compelling” state 
interest requirement was a sport that was on the road to 
oblivion.116 
If the deferential majority had shown no commitment to 
Sweezy’s “compelling state interest” standard, neither did half 
of the high-protectionist minority.  Justices Black and Douglas 
were First Amendment absolutists.  For them, even a stringent 
“exigent and obviously compelling” state interest standard would 
 
112 Uphaus and Barenblatt were argued and decided on the 
same days, with Uphaus as the first case in both instances.  See 
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 72; Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 109. 
 113 See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) (bar 
membership); Konigsburg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 
(1961) (same); Braden v. U.S., 365 U.S. 431 (1961) (legislative 
investigation); Wilkenson v. U.S., 365 U.S. 399 (1961) (same). 
 114 366 U.S. 36 (1961). 
 115 Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 50 (1961).  In the post-Uphaus 
world, it was the equivalence between the “compelling”, 
“sufficiently compelling,” and merely “subordinating” interest 
standards that allowed the deferential Justice Harlan to employ 
the “compelling” standard when he was not speaking for the 
Court.  See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). 
 116 After Uphaus, the deferential majority mentioned the 
“compelling interest” standard once more in a case involving the 
NAACP, but that and other cases show the deferential majority 
was not employing it as a stringent standard.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 122-26, 133-45 (discussing Bates v. Little 
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
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be too low because it involved balancing.117 History showed that 
when tensions rose, balancing gave way to state power.  As 
Martin Shapiro has written, Black and Douglas 
 
repeatedly pointed out [that] ... balancing ... was most 
useful to those who were willing to ... allow ... freedom 
of speech to go by the boards.  Because it allowed a 
flexible weighing in each case without enunciation of any 
principle to which the Court might have to stick even when 
Congress later violated it, and because it constantly 
repeated that it was constitutionally legitimate for 
Congress to violate the First Amendment, ad hoc balancing 
provided a jurisprudential screen behind which judges could 
always yield gracefully .... By overweighing the danger and 
minimizing and excusing the damage to free speech ... the 
Court can always simply surrender to hysteria, and in 
surrendering provide it with a cover of constitutional 
respectability which feeds its fires.118 
The only exception to the demise of the Sweezy standard was 
the Court’s use of it in cases involving attempts by various 
southern states to acquire the NAACP’s membership lists, 
presumably to expose the organizations “rank-and-file ... to 
 
117 Consider, for example, Scull v. Commonwealth of 
Virginia ex rel. Commitee on Law Reform and Racial Activities, 
359 U.S. 344 (1959) decided before Uphaus. Justice Black took 
the rare opportunity of his writing for the Court to tilt the 
law in a high-protectionist direction.  Before deciding the case 
on nonconstitutional grounds, Black mentioned that the Court had 
held that the freedoms of speech, press, and association “cannot 
be invaded unless a compelling state interest is clearly shown.”  
Id. at 352-53.  But he immediately dropped a footnote to 
Warren’s plurality opinion in Sweezy to the effect that “Four 
members of this Court adhere to the view they expressed in 
Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251, ... and 'do 
not now conceive of any circumstances wherein a state interest 
would justify infringement of rights in these fields.’” Scull, 
supra, at 352. 
 118 M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 110.  In an unfortunately 
apt case, Justice Black once ruefully observed that “[t]he 
effect of the Court’s ‘balancing’ ... is that any State may now 
reject an applicant for admission to the Bar if he believes in 
the Declaration of Independence ...”  In Re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 
82, 112 (1961). 
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economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical 
coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”119 
Between the Sweezy and Uphaus decisions, Justice Harlan, writing 
for a unanimous court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
answered the question of  
 
whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in obtaining 
[the NAACP membership list] ... which is sufficient to 
justify the deterrent effect which ... these disclosures 
may well have on the free exercise by [the NAACP’s] members 
... right of association120 
by noting that  
 
Such a ‘... subordinating interest of the State must be 
compelling,’ Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 
...121 
Two years later, in Bates v. City of Little Rock, a case 
that involved the City’s power to obtain the NAACP’s membership 
list to check the NAACP’s claim that it qualified for tax 
purposes as a charitable institution, Justice Stewart said: 
Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal 
liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a 
subordinating interest which is compelling.122 
Perhaps these cases show that Sweezy’s “compelling” 
interest standard was not entirely a sport, even for the Court’s 
low-protectionist majority.  Some contemporaries thought the 
Court was making a special exception to its generally 
 
119 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 
(1958).  The cases discussed in the next paragraphs are 
insightfully set in the context of the Court’s post-Brown v. 
Board of Education struggle with southern intransigence in M. 
Klarman, supra note 98, at 335-37; L. Powe, supra note 49, at 
165-69.  See also M. Klarman, supra, at 335-40, 382-84 
(discussing the South’s overall attack on the NAACP).   
 120 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463. 
 121 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463. 
 122 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).  
See M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 335 (treating Bates as an 
anti-NAACP case). 
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deferential jurisprudence in order to  protect the NAACP in its 
(and the Court’s) battle against massive southern resistence to 
school desegregation.123 Still, it should be noted that: 
 
(1) Patterson may itself have been part of the movement 
away from Sweezy’s strict standard.  In Patterson, Harlan did 
not quote or even cite Sweezy’s first, clearly stringent, 
statement of its standard, which required not just a 
“compelling,” but an “exigent and obviously compelling,” 
interest.124 
(2) In Bates, although Justice Stewart did say the State 
needed a “compelling” interest to prevail, in the very next 
paragraph he concluded his discussion of the law by saying that 
in this case “it becomes the duty of this Court to determine 
whether the [City’s] action bears a reasonable relationship to 
the achievement of the governmental purpose asserted as its 
justification.”125 By using the “compelling” and “reasonable” 
standards interchangeably, Stewart’s opinion intimated an 
equivalence between them.  Indeed, just two weeks after Bates,
most of the low-protectionist Justices showed that they 
understood Bates to stand for the “reasonable” standard when 
they cited and quoted only Stewart’s second paragraph as 
providing “the requirements of our cases.”126 
For these reasons it is proper to see Patterson and Bates
as reflecting the Court’s recession from Sweezy’s stringent 
“exigent and obviously compelling” state interest standard. 
 
123 See M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 82; L. Powe, supra 
note 49, at 169; The Supreme Court, 1962 Term - Leading Cases, 
77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122-23 (1963). 
 124 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460-67.  Similarly, the Bates case, 
in supporting the imposition of a “compelling” standard, did not 
cite Sweezy. Rather, it cited Patterson and a string of cases 
from the 1940s in which only modestly active balancing had been 
employed.  Bates, 361 U.S. at 524. 
 125 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 69 n. 1 (1960) 
(Clark, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., and Whittaker, J., 
dissenting). 
 126 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 69 (1960) (Clark, 
J., joined by Frankfurter, J., and Whittaker, J., dissenting). 
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In the end, even if the Patterson and Bates cases gave 
Sweezy’s “compelling” interest standard some extended life, the 
Court’s deferential majority completely abandoned it in 1961127 
in two cases in which the NAACP once again sought protection 
from hostile southern legislatures.128 
One case, NAACP v. Button,129 involved Virginia’s attempt to 
apply to the NAACP a recently enacted law prohibiting 
solicitation of legal business.  The legislation, which had been 
adopted in 1956 as part of Virginia’s “massive resistance” to 
school desegregation,130 prohibited “any person or organization 
not having a pecuniary right or liability in a lawsuit to 
 
127 For the 1961 date, see The Supreme Court in Conference 
(1940-1985): The Private Discussions Behind Nearly 300 Supreme 
Court Decisions 317 (Del Dickson, ed. 2001) (dating the Court’s 
conference on one of the cases, NAACP v. Button, as Nov. 10, 
1961) (hereinafter D. Dickson); L. Powe, supra note 49, at 155 
(stating the other case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative 
Investigation Committee, was argued in December, 1961; cases 
usually are discussed and voted on in conference shortly after 
their argument). 
 128 The deferential majority’s movement away from employing 
a heightened standard to protect the NAACP was foreshadowed in 
late 1960, in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), when four 
of its members voted to allow Arkansas to require public school 
teachers to file annual affidavits disclosing “every 
organization to which he has belonged or contributed for the 
past five years.”  Id. at 480.  The law was enacted to reveal 
whether teachers were NAACP members.  L. Powe, supra note 49, at 
168.  The Court struck the statute down only because the usually 
deferential Justice Stewart voted with the high-protectionist 
minority on the grounds that the statute should have been more 
“narrowly” tailored given its impact on “fundamental personal 
liberties.”  Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488. 
 129 371 U.S. 415 (1963).  See infra text accompanying note 
146 (explaining why the case’s decision date is 1963, rather 
than 1961, and why the NAACP won rather than lost).  Button is 
tellingly discussed in M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 337-39; L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 169-71. 
 130 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 170; Note, The Supreme 
Court, 1962 Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122 
(1963). 
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solicit legal business for itself or for any attorney.”131 Given 
how the NAACP represented its clients, the law threatened to put 
an end to NAACP litigation.132 
The other case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee,133 arose when the Committee asked the NAACP to reveal 
whether “specific individuals, otherwise identified as, or 
suspected of being, communists were NAACP members.”134 If
allowed, the state would finally have found a way to chill the 
NAACP members’ freedom of association either by revealing their 
membership in the organization or by showing that the NAACP had 
members who also happened to be alleged subversives.135 
In both cases, the Court in conference voted 5-4 against 
the NAACP’s claim that its members’ First Amendment rights were 
impermissibly infringed.136 Justice Frankfurter’s rationale for 
no longer treating NAACP cases as exceptions to his generally 
deferential stance was straightforward.  In his view, the 
statute in Button was not “aimed at the Negroes as such” and he 
could not “imagine a worse disservice than to continue being the 
guardians of the Negroes.”137 “Colored people are now people of 
 
131 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 170; The Supreme Court, 1962 
Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122 (1963). 
 132 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 171. 
 133 372 U.S. 539 (1963).  See infra text accompanying note 
146 (explaining why the case’s decision date is 1963, rather 
than 1961, and why the NAACP won rather than lost).  Gibson is 
tellingly discussed in M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 339; L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 169-71. 
 134 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 541 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also id. at 543 (refusal to identify 14 persons 
“previously identified as communists or members of communist 
front or affiliated organizations” as NAACP members). 
 135 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 547-549, 555-57; L. Powe, supra 
note 49, at 155-56 (describing the case’s potential result as 
“every segregationist’s dream”); The Supreme Court, 1962 Term – 
Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 120 (1963); 
 136 D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317-18 (giving the date 
of the conference as Nov. 10, 1961). 
 137 D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317 (conference notes). 
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substance.  Colored people now have responsible positions,” he 
said.138 
Justice Harlan, in turn, cast his vote to uphold the 
statutes because he believed both states had shown all the 
Constitution required: that the challenged “regulation has a 
reasonable relationship to a proper governmental objective and 
does not unduly interfere with ... individual rights.”139 
Harlan’s view “came straight from his normal First Amendment 
stance:  Interests must be balanced with a heavy hand placed on 
the state’s side.”140 
Harlan’s vote in the Virginia case is particularly telling 
that the deferential minority’s putative exception for NAACP 
cases was over.  Harlan, unlike Frankfurter, acknowledged that 
Virginia’s “law was aimed at the NAACP” because of “the school 
problem.”141 Still, he concluded the “state has that right” 
because it “applies in its statute the proper standards for law 
practice.”142 Clearly, Harlan, who as much as any Justice at 
that time should be identified with opinions employing the 
compelling state interest standard,143 found that the balance of 
 
138 D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 317-18.  Other members 
of the Court had similar qualms, M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 
337, reflecting a concern that, as “an Arkansas jurist” said, 
the Court had become “‘the guardian for the NAACP.’” Id. at 335. 
 139 NAACP, 372 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See 
also id at 453 (“general regulatory statutes” may burden First 
Amendment rights “when they have been found justified by 
subordinating valid governmental interests”); Gibson, 372 U.S. 
at 578-80 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  I am using the dissent 
Justice Harlan eventually wrote to indicate his rationale when 
he voted in conference with what was then the deferential 
majority.  See infra text accompanying note 146 (discussing the 
shift in majority and minority personnel). 
 140 L. Powe, supra note 49, at 219. 
 141 D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 318 
 142 D. Dickson, supra note 127, at 318 
 143 Harlan joined Frankfurter’s Sweezy concurrence, supra 
text accompanying note 76, wrote Patterson, supra note 
accompanying note 120, and joined Stewart’s opinion for the 
Court in Bates, supra note accompanying note 122.  See also 
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interests favored the government whenever its “regulation[s] 
ha[ve] a reasonable relationship to a proper governmental 
objective and does not unduly interfere with individual 
rights.”144 That was his test, and perhaps it was all he ever 
meant by saying the government needed a “subordinating interest” 
that was “compelling.”145 
C. Third Time’s a Charm 
 
Only a number of fortuities saved the NAACP and breathed 
life into Sweezy’s compelling state interest standard.146 Before 
either decision was final, Justice Whittaker resigned for health 
reasons.  Whittaker’s resignation changed the vote to a 4-4 tie, 
and both cases were returned to the Court’s calendar for 
reargument in the 1962 Term.  Then in the summer of 1962, 
Justice Frankfurter suffered a stroke and retired.  President 
Kennedy selected Byron White to fill Whittaker’s seat and 
appointed Arthur Goldberg to the second vacancy.  Goldberg 
proved to be a reliable vote in favor of First Amendment values.  
High-protectionists now dominated the Court. 
 
The last fortuity was how the new majority developed the 
law to implement its high-protectionist vision of the First 
Amendment.  Justices Black and Douglas were First Amendment 
absolutists who spurned any balancing approach to the Bill of 
Rights.147 Their approach, however, had little appeal in the 
 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (stating the compelling interest standard).  He also 
joined Brennan’s opinion in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 
(1958), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes 151-52. 
 144 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (speaking of cases that did not involve “speech 
alone”). 
 145 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 
(1958) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)). 
 146 For the remarks in this paragraph, see M. Horwitz, 
Warren, supra note 31, at 65-66; L. Powe, supra note 49, at 205, 
209-10. 
 147 See supra text accompanying notes 117-18. 
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wider legal culture.148 Chief Justice Warren typically was not 
too concerned with the jurisprudence he used to reach the 
constitutionally correct decision, by which he meant the “fair” 
result.149 By default, as well as by temperament, it fell to 
Justice Brennan to develop the doctrinal structure that would 
reach First Amendment friendly results through a generally 
acceptable jurisprudence. 
 
The “compelling state interest” doctrine, it turns out, was 
congenial to Justice Brennan.  Part of its appeal was that, as a 
balancing test, it mediated the “deadlock” between the Court’s 
deferential-balancing and absolutist camps.150 On the one hand, 
as a form of balancing, the compelling interest standard  
recognized that constitutional rights could be subordinated to 
governmental needs in a particular case.  On the other hand, 
Justice Brennan recognized that if the compelling standard could 
be such a rigorous criterion that its application in almost all 
cases upheld First Amendment claims without the need for 
additional weighing of interests in the particular case.  If 
applied by high-protectionists, the gap between the government’s 
asserted interest and a stringent “compelling interest” 
requirement was so vast as to enable a ruling favorable to First 
Amendment values through a seemingly nondiscretionary 
application of a pre-existing rule to the facts at bar. 
 
Brennan had been using the compelling interest standard 
since shortly after the Sweezy decision.  In 1958, in writing 
for the Court in Speiser v. Randall,151 Brennan mentioned the 
“compelling” standard in passing in ruling that California had 
adopted a procedurally defective means to limit its veterans’ 
 
148 See, e.g., M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 87; Frantz, 
supra note 111, at 1435-38; Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of 
the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 Cal. L. Rev. 
821, 825 (1962); Strong, supra note 111, at 59 (commenting that 
critics of balancing also rejected “Black’s absolutist 
approach”).  But see for its support. 
 149 See, e.g., Ed Cray, Chief Justice 11 (1997); G. Edward 
White, Earl Warren: A Public Life 228 (1982); Mark Tushnet, 
Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 748, 767 
(1995). 
 150 M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 68.   
 151 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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property tax exemption to “loyal” veterans.152 In 1961, arguing 
in dissent in Braunfeld v. Brown153 that Sunday closing laws 
violated the free exercise rights of Orthodox Jews, Brennan used 
the compelling interest standard in a way that anticipated its 
future stringency.154 First he quoted Justice Jackson’s classic 
statement in West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette155 that 
 
The right of the state to regulate, for example, a public 
utility may well include ... power to impose all the 
restrictions which a legislature may have a “rational 
basis” for adopting.  But freedoms of speech and of press, 
of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such 
slender grounds.  They are susceptible of restrictions only 
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which 
the state may lawfully protect.156 
152 Speiser, 357 U.S. at 529.  Today Speiser is regarded as 
the origin of the modern “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine, 
see E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 535, 946 (classic 
decision); Charles Bogle, “Unconscionable” Conditions, 94 Colum. 
L. Rev. 193, 200 n. 27 (1994) (origin); Kathleen Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1413, 1433 (1989) 
(seminal decision).  It is also regarded as the case to which 
the First Amendment “chilling effect” doctrine and burden 
shifting in strict scrutiny traces. See L. Powe, supra note 49, 
at 136 (discussing “chilling effect” and burden shifting).  The 
future significance of the case was not immediately apparent.  
See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1957 Term – Leading Cases, 72 
Harv. L. Rev. 98, 188 (1958) (commenting that the opinion left 
open the substantive question of whether the loyalty oath was 
permissible if the procedures were corrected); L. Powe, supra 
note 49, at 135 (describing Speiser as a “case[] of no immediate 
significance”). 
 153 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 154 Professor Powe describes Braunfeld as reflecting 
Brennan’s “emerging” jurisprudence.  L. Powe, supra note 49, at 
185. 
 155 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 156 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 612 (1961) (Brennan, 
J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).  Erasing a dozen 
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Then he asked: 
 
What, then, is the compelling state interest which impels 
the [state] to impede appellants’ freedom of worship?  What 
overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitutional 
scale that it justified this substantial, though indirect, 
limitation on appellant’s freedom?157 
Brennan’s answer was that there was none.  In thrashing out 
that answer, Brennan noted that Sunday closing laws did promote 
valid state interests.  It was “convenien[t],” he admitted, for 
“everyone to rest on the same day.”158 He allowed, also, that 
“granting ... an exemption would make Sundays a little noisier, 
and the task of police and prosecutor a little more 
difficult.”159 Still, in Brennan’s view, these interests were 
not “high enough to justify”160 the “substantial”161 burden on 
“non-Sunday observers.”162 
In 1963, in writing for the Court’s new majority in NAACP 
v. Button,163 the first of the two re-argued cases to be decided, 
Brennan reiterated the approach of his Braunfeld dissent.164 In
years of Supreme Court precedent, Brennan claimed that “[t]his 
exacting standard has been consistently applied by this Court as 
the test of legislation under all clauses of the First 
amendment.” Id. 
 157 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 613-14 (Brennan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
 158 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 159 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
 160 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 615-16 (Brennan, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
 161 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 616. 
 162 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 615.  
 163 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 164 Professor Powe has also noted that the decision in the 
two re-argued cases involved a shift from deferential balancing 
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Button, Brennan conceded that Virginia had a “valid ... 
interest”165 in regulating the legal profession, but he insisted 
that 
 
The decisions of this Court, have consistently held that 
only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a 
subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate 
can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.166 
Thus Virginia’s interest in regulating the legal profession, 
particularly the “traditionally illegal practices of barratry, 
maintenance and champerty,”167 was unavailing because Virginia 
had not demonstrated “a serious danger ... of professionally 
reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against 
solicitation frequently seek to prevent.”168 
Sensing that the Court was headed in a new direction in 
Button, Harlan entered a long, impassioned dissent for himself 
and Justices Clark and Stewart, the remaining members of the 
former majority.169 The gist of Harlan’s dissent was that “a 
 
to a stringent compelling state interest test.  L. Powe, supra 
note 49, at 221.  The Harvard Law Review immediately noticed a 
heightening of judicial review.  See The Supreme Court, 1962 
Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 122 (1963) 
(suggesting that “associational interests will be weighted more 
heavily in the future and that legislative motives may be 
subject to close judicial scrutiny”). 
 165 Button, 371 U.S. at 439. 
 166 Button, 371 U.S. at 438.  See also id. at 439 (quoting 
Bates v. Arkansas, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) that “[w]here there 
is significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may 
prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is 
compelling”).  See supra text accompanying notes 122-26 
(discussing Bates). 
 167 Button, 371 U.S. at 439. 
 168 Button, 371 U.S. at 443. 
 169 Button, 371 U.S. at 448-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Justice White concurred and dissented, finding much in common 
with Justice Harlan.  Id. at 447-48 (White, J., concurring and 
dissenting). 
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sufficiently compelling subordinating state interest has been 
shown to justify Virginia’s ... regulation”170 because all the 
Constitution required was that “the particular regulation ... 
ha[ve] a reasonable relation to the furtherance of a proper 
state interest, and [that] ... that interest outweighs any 
foreseeable harm to the furtherance of protected freedoms.”171 
Harlan was voicing the now supplanted deferential balancing 
approach to First Amendment problems. 
 
The new majority’s decision in the second of the two re-
argued cases, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigative 
Committee,172 was cut from the same cloth as Button. The opinion 
was written by Justice Goldberg, the Court’s most junior member.  
At the outset of his analysis, Goldberg laid out the 
Constitution’s requirements as he understood them: 
 
[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an 
investigation which intrudes into the area of 
constitutional protected rights of speech, press, 
association, and petition that the State convincingly show 
a substantial relation between the information being sought 
and a subject of overriding and compelling state 
interest.173 
He then “assum[ed]” that the prior legislative investigation 
cases, which included Upaus v. Wyman174 and Barenblatt v. United 
States,175 were correctly decided, but distinguished them on the 
 
170 Button, 371 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(reviewing the majority’s conclusion). 
 171 Button, 371 U.S. at 455 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See 
also id. at 454 (saying indirect regulation of First Amendment 
freedoms “will be sustained if the regulation has a reasonable 
relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not 
unduly interfere with such individual rights”). 
 172 372 U.S. 539 (1963).  Gibson was handed down two months 
after Button.
173 Gibson, 372 U.S. 546. 
 174 360 U.S. 72 (1959).  See supra text accompanying notes 
101-05 (discussing Uphaus). 
 175 360 U.S. 109 (1959).  See supra text accompanying notes 
106-12 (discussing Barenblatt). 
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unconvincing ground that they involved uncovering whether an 
individual was a member of the Communist Party, not whether 
individual communists were members of an otherwise legitimate 
organization.176 He then held that the 
 
record in this case is insufficient to show a substantial 
connection between the ... NAACP and Communist activities 
... which is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating the 
immediate, substantial, and subordinating state interest 
necessary to sustain its right of inquiry into the 
membership lists of the association.177 
And he concluded: 
 
The ... Committee has failed to demonstrate the compelling 
and subordinating government interest essential to support 
direct inquiry into the membership records of the NAACP.178 
Once again, Justice Harlan issued a rejoinder for himself 
and the remaining deferential Justices.179 Harlan thought that 
cases like Uphaus and Barenblatt should govern because he saw no 
difference between investigations involving “Communist 
infiltration of organizations and Communist activity by 
organizations.”180 He concluded, a bit wearily, with the 
deferential jurists’ mantra that: 
 
There can be no doubt that the judging of challenges 
respecting legislative or executive investigations in this 
 
176 Gibson, 372 U.S. 547-48.  See also L. Powe, supra note 
49, at 221 (saying Harlan was “correct” in stating that “the 
Court’s reasoning is difficult to grasp); The Supreme Court 
Term, 1962 Term – Leading Cases, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 120-21 
(1963) (critiquing Justice Goldberg’s decision). 
 177 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 551. 
 178 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557.  Justices Douglas and Black 
concurred on absolutist grounds.  Gibson, 360 U.S. at 558 
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 559 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 179 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 576 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
Justice White joined Harlan’s opinion but also dissented 
separately.  Id. at 583 (White, J., dissenting).  
 180 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 579 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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sensitive area demands the utmost circumspection on the 
part of courts .... But this surely carries with it the 
reciprocal responsibility of respecting legitimate state 
and local authority in this field.  With all respect, I 
think that in deciding this case as it has the Court has 
failed to keep in mind that responsibility.181 
Two months after Gibson, whatever doubt might exist that 
the Court had entered a new era and that the “compelling state 
interest” requirement was being taken up by the new majority in 
earnest was erased by Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court in 
Sherbert v. Verner.182 Sherbert voided, on free exercise 
grounds, South Carolina’s denial of unemployment compensation to 
a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on Saturday, which 
was her Sabbath.  Although Justice Brennan distinguished 
Braunfeld v. Brown,183 his analysis was a stunning departure from 
the approach that had governed that case.  Sherbert made 
Brennan’s Braunfeld dissent the law of the land. 
 
Just like Braunfeld, Sherbert involved a general law that 
promoted secular objectives but whose application in the 
particular case incidentally burdened religious practice.  In 
Braunfeld, six Justices held that indirect burdens on religion 
required only reasonable basis review.184 In Sherbert, Brennan, 
joined by five other Justices, employed the compelling state 
interest test to void the law.185 In his opinion, after 
 
181 Gibson, 372 U.S. at 582-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 182 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 183 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 408.  The concurring and 
dissenting Justices mentioned Braunfeld. The dissenting 
Justices found Brennan’s distinction insupportable, id. at 421 
(Harlan, J., dissenting).  So did Justice Stewart, who concurred 
only in the result and urged that Braunfeld be overruled, id. at 
at 417 (Steward, J., concurring).  See also L. Powe, supra note 
49, at 370-71 (discussing the relation of the two cases). 
 184 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 600 (1961) (opinion by Warren 
joined by Black, Clark, and Whittaker); McGowan v. Maryland, 466 
U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (concurrence by Frankfurter, joined by 
Harlan, applies to Braunfeld was well).  
 185 Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 403, 406.  Justices Douglas and 
Stewart concurred without indicating their agreement with 
Brennan’s standard.  Id. at 410 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. 
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determining that Sherbert’s free exercise rights were 
significantly burdened,186 Justice Brennan asserted: 
 
We must next consider whether some compelling state 
interest ... justified the substantial infringement of 
appellant’s First Amendment right.  It is basic that no 
showing of a rational relationship to some colorable state 
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive 
constitutional area, “[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interest, give occasion for 
permissible limitation.”187 
In applying this stringent standard, Brennan not only found that 
“[n]o such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present 
case,” but he also declared that even if there were “it would 
plainly be incumbent upon the [State] to demonstrate that no 
alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without 
infringing First Amendment rights.”188 Sherbert was the first 
clear, succinct, and complete statement of what constitutional 
lawyers have come to mean by the phrase “strict scrutiny.”189 
at 413 (Stewart, J., concurring in result).  Why Justice Black, 
who preferred an absolutist approach, and Justice Clark, who 
tended to be a low-protectionist, joined Brennan’s majority 
opinion is not clear.   
 186 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403-06. 
 187 Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945). 
 188 Sherbert, 372 U.S. at 407. 
 189 Although strict scrutiny became a majority-backed 
doctrine of First Amendment law in 1963, it was just one of the 
many techniques by which the Warren Court’s new majority’s 
substantially heightened protections for First Amendment 
liberties.  Between 1964 and 1969, only a handful of First 
Amendment cases relied on the compelling state interest test to 
void governmental regulations.  William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 
31 (1968) (political association); DeGregory v. Attorney 
General, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (legislative investigation); 
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1965) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (right of addressees to receive 
communist propaganda).  See also NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 
118, 122 (1966) (Douglas, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Brennan, 
J., and Fortas, J., dissenting from cert. denial); U.S. v. 
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III. The Spread of the Compelling State Interest Test 
 and Strict Scrutiny 
 
With Sherbert’s stunning departure from Braunfeld, the
compelling state interest test’s and strict scrutiny’s long 
birthing process came to an end.  After Sherbert, the compelling 
state interest standard and strict scrutiny began to spread 
beyond the First Amendment, the situs of their gestation and 
birth, into equal protection analysis.  Their spread, however, 
was surprisingly slow, given the conventional understanding that 
traces strict scrutiny back to Skinner v. Oklahoma190 and 
Korematsu v. United States191 and sees that doctrine as 
underlying the Court’s landmark voting rights and racial 
discrimination precedents, Reynolds v. Sims192 and McLaughlin v. 
Florida,193 in 1964.194 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (discussing but rejecting 
using the compelling standard to decide symbolic speech cases) 
 
In other words, beginning in 1963, strict scrutiny was a 
part of the Court’s First Amendment toolkit, but rarely was the 
tool of choice.  The prominent place of strict scrutiny in First 
Amendment law is a consequence of its having become prominent 
elsewhere, and then, like the prodigal son, returning to the 
land of its birth.  The prominent use of strict scrutiny in 
First Amendment analysis dates from the mid-1970s.  See First 
Nat. Bk. of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 795 (1978); 
Buckley v. Veleo, 424 U.S. 1, 66, 74-75 (1976).  Consider that 
the centrally important “content-based / content-neutral” 
distinction, with the compelling state interest standard applied 
to the former but not the latter, is commonly traced back to  
Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).  But Mosely
employs strict scrutiny as part of an equal protection, not 
First Amendment, analysis.  
 190 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
 191 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 192 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (voting rights), discussed infra 
text accompanying note 231. 
 193 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (racial classification), discussed 
infra text accompanying notes 236, 241-46 and n. 231 . 
 194 See, e.g., See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
223 (1995) (associating McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 
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In fact, after strict scrutiny’s appearance in the First 
Amendment in 1963, its various branches migrated piecemeal into 
the Equal Protection Clause.  The compelling state interest 
test, which was the last branch of strict scrutiny to make the 
move, was not employed in equal protection analysis until 
1969.195 When the compelling interest standard appeared in the 
Equal Protection Clause, it was in fundamental rights cases.  It 
was not used in racial discrimination cases for another decade. 
 
A. Strict Scrutiny in Name Only 
 
Strict scrutiny traces back to Skinner v. Oklahoma196 in 
name only.  Although Skinner used the term “strict scrutiny,” it 
employed an analysis that we would call “minimal scrutiny with 
bite.”197 In Skinner, Justice Douglas straightforwardly 
determined that the classification at bar, which had the effect 
of sterilizing recidivist chicken thieves but not recidivist 
embezzlers, did not have a rational basis.198 His strict 
scrutiny analysis made no mention of any requirement of burden 
shifting, narrow tailoring, or a compelling state interest. 
 
Korematsu’s relation to the development of strict scrutiny 
is more complex.  In Korematsu, Justice Black famously said not 
only that racial classifications “are immediately suspect” and 
“subject to the most rigid scrutiny,” but allowed that 
“[p]ressing public necessity may sometimes justify” them.199 
This intimates that, like in modern strict scrutiny, an 
exceedingly important state interest may outweigh the Fourteenth 
 
(1964) with strict scrutiny);  Exxon v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 
195 (1983) (same);  Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 519 (1973) 
(tracing the compelling state interest standard back to Reynold 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) for voting rights, and to 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) for racial 
classifications). 
 195 See infra text accompanying notes 265-77. 
 196 316 U.S. 353, 541 (1942). 
 197 See supra text accompanying note 26 (describing minimal 
scrutiny with bite). 
 198 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538-39. 
 199 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
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Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination.  Black never defined 
the notion of “[p]ressing public necessity” with greater 
precision.  Most likely, if Black had elaborated on its meaning 
he would have pointed to the clear and present danger test.  
That is the test Justice Murphy, in dissent, expressly imposed 
on the government and said it had failed to meet.200 
Perhaps Black’s intimation in Korematsu that the state had 
a higher burden of justification was of no moment.  The analysis 
he employed in the case was a form of rational basis review that 
was exceedingly deferential to the military’s claims.201 In 
large measure, Korematsu was predicated on Hirabayashi v. United 
States202 which was decided on rational basis grounds.203 In 
Korematsu, Black neither placed the burden of proof on the 
government nor required that its internment order be narrowly 
tailored.  Although he intimated a heightened state interest 
requirement for racial classifications, he entirely deferred to 
the government’s assertion that it was met.204 
200 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) 
(“The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of 
military necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of 
his constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is 
reasonably related to a public danger that is so ‘immediate, 
imminent, and impending' as not to admit of delay and not to 
permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional processes to 
alleviate the danger”).  On the prominence of the “clear and 
present danger” test as the 1940s paradigmatic stringent 
standard, see Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at 320-28, 332; 
Siegel, Death, supra note 17, at *. 
 201 See David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme 
Court:  The Second Century, 1888-1986, at 292 & 292 n. 98 (1990) 
(saying Black’s scrutiny in Korematsu was quite deferential to 
the military). 
 202 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 203 Id. at 101. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218-19; id. at 
224 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“I am unable to see how the 
legal considerations that led to the decision in ... Hirabayashi
... fail to sustain the military order which made the conduct 
now in controversy a crime”). 
 204 Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 232. 
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Then again, perhaps Black’s intimation had greater 
significance.  Black’s Korematsu intimation had an echo, four 
years later, in Oyama v. California.205 Oyama involved a 
California statutory presumption that discriminated against 
Japanese-Americans.  The presumption was a prophylactic rule 
that helped enforce the state’s ban on alien land ownership.206 
In Oyama, the Court assumed that the anti-alien land ownership 
law was legitimate, and seemed to accept that the prophylactic 
rule was a rational means to enforce it.207 Nevertheless, the 
Court voided the rule.  In writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Vinson alluded, without citation, to Black’s Korematsu
intimation, saying “we start with the proposition that only the 
most exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” on 
“the basis of ... racial descent.”208 Then he explain the 
prophylactic rule’s invalidity on the grounds that:   
 
In the light most favorable to the State, this case 
presents a conflict between the State's right to formulate 
a policy of landholding within its bounds and the right of 
American citizens to own land anywhere in the United 
States.  When these two rights clash, the rights of a 
citizen may not be subordinated merely because of his 
father's country of origin.209 
205 332 U.S. 633 (1948). 
 206 California law prohibited aliens who were ineligible 
for citizenship from owning land.  At the time of the case, 
Japanese were the most prominent of a small group of aliens who 
were ineligible for American citizenship.  The prophylactic 
presumption was that a transaction was made to evade the ban on 
alien land ownership if it resulted (1) in a citizen who was a 
child (2) receiving land paid for by his or her parents (3) when 
his or her parents were aliens ineligible to own land 
themselves.  Id. at 635-44.  
 207 Id. at 646. See also id. at 684-86 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting).  But see id. at 663 (Murphy, J., concurring) 
(attacking the prophylactic rule’s rationality because “it stems 
directly from racial hatred and intolerance”).   
 208 Id. at 646.
209 Id. at 647.
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Oyama was a balancing-of-interests decision that voided a 
racial classification, not because its basis was irrational, but 
because it was of insufficient weight to “subordinate” the 
“right of American citizens to own land anywhere in the United 
States.”210 Oyama required the state to have more than a 
rational basis for discriminating among its citizens on the 
basis of race.211 
In light of Oyama, perhaps Black’s Korematsu intimation may 
be explained by acknowledging that during the time that the 
civil libertarian quartet of Black, Douglas, Murphy, and 
Rutledge sat on the bench, there was some drift toward 
heightening the state’s burden of justification in racial 
classification cases.212 If so, that development would parallel 
and reflect (though very slightly) the civil libertarians 
influence on First Amendment jurisprudence.213 It may be that 
during the 1940s, there was some movement toward according the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from invidious 
racial discrimination sufficient weight to prevent it from being 
 
210 Id.
211 But see Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 235-36 
(explaining Oyama on the ground that it involved the right to 
own property, which was a fundamental right, and although the 
pre-Brown Court did not ban racial classifications generally, it 
did ban them in the limited area of fundamental rights).  
Professor Klarman reads Oyama as not applicable to racial 
classifications generally.  While significant, Klarman’s 
limitation does not fully account for Black’s “pressing 
necessities” comment in Korematsu which Chief Justice Vinson 
alludes to as the basis for the ruling in Oyama. Korematsu did 
not involve a fundamental right.  
 212 See M. Urofsky, supra note 4, at 16-18, 21-26, 28-29 
(discussing the liberalism of these Justices); Craig Green, 
Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at 
War, 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. ___ (2006, forthcoming) (available at 
SSRN_ID905587_code497260.pdf.) (discussing Rutledge’s civil 
libertarianism). 
 213 M. Horwitz, Warren, supra note 31, at 56 (discussing 
the influence of these Justices on the First Amendment in the 
1940s) 
Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at 320-28 (same); Siegel, 
Death, supra note 17, at *. 
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“subordinated merely because” the state was pursuing a 
legitimate goal.214 
Nevertheless, any intimation that the government faced a 
heightened burden of justification in racial classification 
cases disappeared in 1949 when Murphy and Rutledge died and 
power on the Court passed to more deferential Justices.215 After 
their death, although the Court did not forget that racial 
classifications were “constitutionally suspect,”216 it ceased 
demanding more than that a state, in enacting a racial 
classification, pursue a legitimate end through reasonable 
means.217 
The NAACP understood the deferential stance of the Court’s 
dominant Justices in the 1950s.  Its argument in Brown v. Board 
of Education presumed that segregation was justified if it was a 
reasonable means to promote a permissible state end.218 In 1954, 
the Court momentously ruled that “[s]egregation in public 
education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental 
objective.”219 Over the next decade, in a series of Per Curiam 
 
214 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948). 
 215 M. Horwitz, supra note 31, at 56 (discussing the new 
Justices Clark and Minton); Mendelson, Clear, supra note 52, at 
328 (same). 
 216 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).  
 217 See, e.g., Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499-500 (quoted infra 
text accompanying note 219); Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 
10, at 227, 229-30, 232-40 (saying that in the 1940s, the 
general thinking of the Court, even in racial classification 
cases, was the Equal Protection Clause required that government 
action be a reasonable means to promote a legitimate state end 
except where a limited group of fundamental rights were 
concerned).  Note also that between 1948 and 1964, the Court 
never mentioned that it reviewed racial classifications using 
“rigid” scrutiny.  “Strict scrutiny” was mentioned only once, in 
Justice Harlan’s dissent to Poe v. Ullman, 363 U.S. 497, 548 
(1961), which was a substantive due process case. 
 218 Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 233 n. 86 
(citing Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 671-72, 674 (1976). 
 219 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
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opinions, the Court extended that judgment to a wide variety of 
governmental activities, actions and regulations.220 
Thus, until 1964, the Court’s remarkable achievement in 
overturning the system of Jim Crow legislation followed from a 
shift in the universe of legitimate state goals and permissible 
means recognized by the Court.  Although at the time the Court 
was coy about it,221 with hindsight it is fair to say that before 
1954 racial segregation was a reasonable means to pursue 
legitimate state ends; after 1954 it was not.  With that shift 
in the universe of licit ends and means, the court was able to 
strike down racial segregation without changing burden of proof 
requirements, insisting on narrow tailoring, or demanding a 
compelling state interest.  It could void race-based segregation 
based on the simple truth that those laws were not “reasonably 
related to any proper governmental objective.”222 All those 
cases were rational basis, not strict scrutiny, overrulings.223 
220 Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (public records); 
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (court room seating); 
New Orleans Parks Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public 
parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (city buses); 
Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf 
courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) 
(public beaches and bathhouses). 
 221 See Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1481-84 
(discussing the post-Brown rulings). 
 222 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).  See also 
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam reversal 
of contempt of court conviction for refusing to comply with 
segregated seating arrangement of a court room, saying simply “a 
State may not constitutionally require segregation of public 
facilities”). 
 223 See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per 
curiam reversal of contempt of court conviction where on ground 
that “it is no longer open to question that a State may not 
constitutionally require segregation of public facilities”); 
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 226-27, 238-43 
(discussing absence of rule that racial classifications were 
“presumptively unconstitutional” before 1964). 
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B. Heightened But Not Strict Scrutiny 
 
The Court did not attempt more until 1964, the year after 
strict scrutiny was established in its First Amendment cases.  
And even when, in 1964, the Court began to import strict 
scrutiny analysis into equal protection, its progress was slow 
and piecemeal.  Strict scrutiny’s slow spread into equal 
protection is readily apparent if we recall that strict scrutiny 
is but one of a number of distinct forms of intensified 
review,224 and that strict scrutiny contains three branches: 
burden shifting, compelling state interest, and narrow tailoring 
requirements.225 
Thus, when the new Warren Court majority emerged in 1963, 
it had in its jurisprudential toolkit a number of analytic 
approaches and doctrines with which to increase the Court’s 
protection of constitutional norms in equal protection cases.  
It could, for example, create stringent rules, consider whether 
government action rationally advanced legitimate state ends, and 
demand that government action be narrowly tailored to achieve a 
permissible purpose.226 It could also simply employ a general 
balancing approach to adjudicating the clashing interests 
involved in Equal Protection litigation.227 All this was in 
addition to the possibility of requiring, as it had just done in 
the First Amendment cases of Button, Gibson, and Sherbert, that
the government’s action promote a compelling state interest.228 
224 See supra text accompanying note 24-34 (discussing the 
forms of heightened scrutiny). 
 225 See supra text accompanying note 35-48 (discussing 
strict scrutiny). 
 226 There are, of course, many other techniques for 
enhancing constitutional protections, including interpreting 
statutes to avoid burdening favored rights.  See, e.g., Ex Parte 
Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 299-301 (1944); Mendelson, Clear, supra note 
52, at 321 (discussing the First Amendment). 
 227 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the 
Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J. 943 (1987) (discussing balancing 
in constitutional law); Developments, supra note 41, at 1103-04, 
1122-23 (discussing Equal Protection cases). 
 228 See supra text accompanying notes 163-89 (discussing 
Button, Gibson, and Sherbert). 
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Between 1964 and 1968, the new majority drew on many of 
these approaches and doctrines in ramping up the Equal 
Protection Clause to give ever increasing protection to 
constitutional values.229 In Reynolds v. Sims,230 for example, 
the Court created a new stringent rule, the requirement of “one 
person, one vote” to adjudicate the constitutionality of 
population disparities among legislative districts.231 In Harper 
v. Virginia State Board of Elections,232 the Court struck down 
the century old institution of conditioning the right to vote on 
the payment of poll taxes, arguing that since  “[w]ealth ... is 
not germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the 
electoral process,”233 taxing the right to vote had “no relation” 
to any legitimate public purpose.234 And in McLaughlin v. 
229 The Court had been redeveloping the Equal Protection 
clause from even before Earl Warren’s tenure.  The point is that 
after 1962, that development increases exponentially.  See L. 
Powe, supra note 49, at 202, 248, 262, 266, 288, 384, 449, 451 
(recounting Warren Court’s equal protection rulings after 1963); 
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 250-82 (same).  
 230 373 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 231 For another example of the Court voiding state action 
under the Equal Protection Clause using a stringent rule see 
Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam reversal of 
contempt of court conviction where on ground that “it is no 
longer open to question that a State may not constitutionally 
require segregation of public facilities”).  See also Tancil v. 
Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (summarily affirming Hamm v. Va. St. 
Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp 156 (D.C.E.D. Va. 1964) which 
voided racially separate voting and property assessment rolls on 
grounds that “decisional law has made it axiomatic that no State 
can directly dictate or casually promote a distinction in the 
treatment of persons solely on the basis of their color”); 
Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 254-57 (saying it was 
in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) that the Court 
finally adopted a rule that racial classifications were 
presumptively invalid). 
 232 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 233 Harper, 383 U.S. at 668. 
 234 Harper, 383 U.S. at 666.  See also id. at 670 (“wealth 
or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting 
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Florida,235 the Court ended the equally well-established 
institution of punishing interracial fornication more heavily 
than same-race fornication, reasoning that such laws were not 
narrowly tailored.  Even though the Court was willing to indulge 
the assumption that differential punishment of interracial and 
same-race fornication was “enacted pursuant to a valid state 
interest,” it voided the law because it was not “necessary” to 
the accomplishment of that permissible purpose.236 
In no case, however, did the Court rely on the compelling 
state interest standard.  It would be inaccurate to say that, in 
these years, the compelling state interest standard was entirely 
absent from Equal Protection litigation.  Only two months after 
using the compelling state interest standard to decide the First 
Amendment case, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation 
Committee,237 Justice Goldberg mentioned the compelling interest 
standard when he wrote for the Court in Watson v. City of 
Memphis.238 In Watson, Memphis argued that it could delay 
desegregating its municipal recreation facilities because of 
“good faith” fears of “interracial disturbances, violence, 
riots, and community confusion and turmoil.”239 In beginning his 
 
qualifications”).  For another example of the Court voiding 
state action under the Equal Protection Clause for the absence 
of any rational relation to a legitimate state interest, see 
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 
(1968); Gunther, supra note 26, at 30-33 (discussing Glona).  
 235 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 236 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.  For other examples of the 
Court voiding legislation under the Equal Protection Clause 
because the law did not precisely target the evil it was 
directed against, see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94-97 
(1965) (absolute prohibition of voting by military personnel who 
live on bases in the state ruled invalid; state could have 
adopted administrative procedures to determine which servicemen 
and women were not bona fide residents).  
 237 372 U.S. 539 (1963).  See supra text accompanying notes 
172-81 (discussing Gibson). 
 238 373 U.S. 526 (1963). 
 239 Watson, 373 U.S. at 535.  Memphis relied on Brown v. 
Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for its argument that a 
slow pace was permissible.  Id. at 530-33.  The Court 
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opinion, Goldberg set the stage for a ruling against Memphis’s 
plea by stating “The basic guarantees of our Constitution are 
warrants for the here and now and, unless there is an 
overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to be promptly 
fulfilled.”240 
The following year, however, in McLaughlin v. Florida,241 
the more conservative Justice White enunciated a standard whose 
stringency was more ambiguous.  At the outset of his opinion 
striking down the state’s differential punishment of interracial 
and same-race fornication, he said: 
 
Our inquiry ... is whether there clearly appears in the 
relevant materials some overriding statutory purpose 
requiring the proscription of the specified conduct when 
engaged in by a white person and a Negro, but not 
otherwise.242 
Three years later, in voiding anti-miscegenation laws in 
Loving v. Virginia,243 Chief Justice Warren picked up Justice 
White’s, not Justice Goldberg’s, turn of phrase, saying: 
“[t]here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose 
independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies 
this classification.”244 
These cases did not, however, establish the compelling 
interest standard as part of equal protection analysis.  
Goldberg’s comment in Watson and White’s and Warren’s remarks in 
McLaughlin and Loving, were not the ratio decedendi of their 
respective cases.  Justice Goldberg mentioned the compelling 
interest standard in his peroration in Watson, but he decided 
the case by applying to the maxim “that constitutional rights 
 
distinguished schools because of their complexity and treated 
Brown as an “significant” departure from “the usual principle.”  
Id at 532. 
 240 Watson, 373 U.S. at 533. 
 241 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 242 McLuaghlin, 379 U.S. at 192. 
 243 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 244 Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
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may not be denied simply because of hostility to their 
assertion.”245 Similarly, whatever Justice White meant by his 
invocation of the ambiguous and inherently less stringent 
“overriding” purpose requirement in McLaughlin, he decided the 
case by holding: 
 
There is involved here an exercise of the state police 
power which trenches upon the constitutionally protected 
freedom from invidious official discrimination based on 
race.  Such a law, even though enacted pursuant to a valid 
state interest, bears a heavy burden of justification, as 
we have said, and will be upheld only if it is necessary, 
and not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of 
a permissible state policy.246 
Loving is similar.  Chief Justice Warren decided the case 
on the rule, paraphrased from McLaughlin, that if 
 
racial classifications in criminal statutes ... are ever to 
be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the 
accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the 
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.247 
He mentioned the “overriding purpose” standard only in passing.  
It had no consequential role in disposing of the case. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Justice Harlan wrote a 
special concurrence in McLaughlin stating his agreement with the 
Court’s decision to import the First Amendment’s narrow 
tailoring principle into racial discrimination cases.248 “The 
necessity test,” he said,  
 
245 Watson, 373 U.S. 535. 
 246 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). 
 247 Loving, 388 U.S. 11 (emphasis added).  See also Note, 
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 Yale L.J. 1237, 
1245-51 (1974) (saying Loving required only narrow tailoring and 
a permissible state objective, and finding this consonant with 
the Court’s other suspect classification cases). 
 248 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 197 (emphasis supplied).  
McLaughlin was the first time this had occurred.  Previously, 
whenever the Court had voided segregation statutes, it had done 
so by finding that the statute did not pursue a legitimate state 
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which developed to protect free speech against state 
infringement should be equally applicable in a case 
involving state racial discrimination – prohibition of 
which lies at the very heart of the Fourteenth Amendment.249 
Yet, there is nothing in Harlan’s thoughtful concurrence to 
indicate that he understood that White’s opinion also imported 
any other aspect of First Amendment law. 
 
What, then, is the meaning of the Court’s occasional and 
ambiguous statements, made in Watson, McLaughlin, and Loving,
that implied the state needed more than a merely legitimate 
purpose to enact racial classifications or burden fundamental 
interests?  Perhaps it is best to rely on the conclusion reached 
by the editors of the Harvard Law Review in their classic note, 
“Developments in the Law – Equal Protection,” published in 
March, 1969.250 Their encyclopedic and seminal project organized 
and crystallized much of the Warren Court’s historic 
transformation of the Equal Protection Clause.251 Their reading 
of the cases certainly reflects informed contemporary 
understanding.  Moreover, their conclusion was reached without 
the distorting influence of hindsight.  
 
Although the editors treated Watson as an important 
remedies case about the circumstances in which delaying 
desegregation orders were appropriate,252 they never mentioned 
Goldberg’s dicta regarding the compelling interest standard.  In 
contrast, they took McLaughlin and Loving as significant 
statements of substantive law and treated them throughout their 
 
interest.  See, e.g, Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) 
(overturning contempt of court conviction for refusing to comply 
with courtroom segregation); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960) (municipal boundary drawing with no discernible 
purpose other than racial exclusion).  
 249 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 197. 
 250 Developments, supra note 41. 
 251 It is one of the most cited student writings of all 
time.   
 252 See Developments, supra note 41, at 1139-40 nn. 43, 48, 
50. 
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“Standards of Review” section.253 Focusing on McLaughlin, most 
likely because it was the seminal precedent, the editors read 
that case as suggesting both a narrow tailoring principle,254 and 
a concern for whether  
 
the public interest involved outweighs the detriments that 
will be incurred by the affected private parties.  In 
calculating the magnitude of the public need for the 
measure, the courts must consider both the extent of the 
benefits accruing to society and the degree of risk which 
will be incurred if a measure of that nature is not 
permitted.  Similarly, the actual cost of the measure must 
be determined by examining both the importance of the 
individual or group rights infringed and the extent to 
which the measure will have long-term adverse effects on 
those interests.255 
Apparently, the editors understood McLaughlin’s “overriding 
purpose” language as implicating a balancing approach to the 
state’s burden of justification.  Indeed, in analyzing the Equal 
Protection Clause’s requirements for government action that 
created suspect classifications or burdened fundamental 
interests, the editors organized their discussion around three 
strands:  a search for a legitimate purpose,256 narrow 
tailoring,257, and balancing.258 The editors never mentioned or 
 
253 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 41, at 1076, 1081 
nn. 24 & 26, 1090, 1091 n. 86, 1099 n. 132, 1102, 1124 
(discussing and citing McLaughlin and Loving). 
 254 See Developments, supra note 41, at 1101-03 (discussing 
and citing McLaughlin). 
 255 Developments, supra note 41, at 1103. 
 256 Developments, supra note 41, at 1091 (speaking of 
“discriminatory purpose”). 
 257 Developments, supra note 41, at 1101, 1121 (speaking of 
“relevance to purpose”). 
 258 Developments, supra note 41, at 1103, 1122.  The 
editors’ analysis parallels the strands of modern strict 
scrutiny, see supra text text accompanying notes 35-37, except 
that it substitutes balancing for the compelling interest 
standard. 
56
even hinted that strict scrutiny had a “compelling state 
interest” requirement.259 
In short, the Developments editors ignored Watson’s 
substantive standard, and read McLaughlin’s “overriding purpose” 
language as instantiating a balancing approach to the state’s 
burden of justification.  Theirs is a sensible reading 
reflecting the understanding of their time. For decades, a 
concern for whether the state, in burdening constitutional 
rights, had an “overriding justification” was a staple of 
balancing of interests jurisprudence.260 In addition, in Tancil 
v. Woolls,261 the Court had upheld, without opinion, Virginia’s 
legislation requiring that divorce records reflect the racial 
heritage of the parties.262 The significance of that decision 
was not lost on Justices Douglas and Stewart.  When, in 
 
259 The editors did say 
 
It now seems doubtful that any objective short of the 
exigencies of war-time emergency would justify the 
imposition of any long-term burdens on a racial basis, 
especially racial segregation. Indeed, even under crisis 
conditions, it is not clear that a state would be permitted 
to impose serious deprivations because of an individual's 
race. 
 
Developments, supra note 41, at 1090.  But they saw this outcome 
as a result of the balancing approach, not the compelling 
interest standard. 
 260 See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 
567 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Commerce Clause 
balancing); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 294 (1941) 
(Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (First Amendment balancing). 
 261 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (Per Curiam). 
 262 See Hamm v. Virginia State Board of Election, 230 F. 
Supp. 156, 158 (D.C.E.D.Va. (1964), upheld, sub nom. Tancil v. 
Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (Per Curiam).  See also, Washington 
v. Lee, 263 F.Supp. 327 (D.C.M.D.Ala 1966), upheld sub nom. Lee 
v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (Per Curiam) in which the 
lower court struck down segregated prisons but allowed 
segregation in “isolated instances,” such as Birmingham’s drunk 
tank, where the need for “security and discipline necessitates 
segregation.”  Washington, 263 F.Supp. at 331. 
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McLaughlin, they joined in a concurrence advocating a rule of 
per se invalidity for racial classifications, Tancil drove them 
to limit their suggestion to “criminal offense[s].”263 
Balancing, not absolutism, seemed the order of the day.264 
C. Strict Scrutiny At Last 
 
The Harvard Law Review editors’ reading of the course of 
Equal Protection Clause litigation had a shelf life of one 
month.  In April, 1969 in Shapiro v. Thompson,265 the Supreme 
Court struck down Connecticut’s and Washington, D.C.’s one-year 
residency requirement for receiving welfare benefits.  Writing 
for the Court, Justice Brennan rejected the governments’ 
argument that their residency requirement rationally promoted 
four legitimate state objectives.266 “But, of course,” Brennan 
wrote,  
 
the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases.  
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental 
right of interstate movement, its constitutionality must be 
judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a 
compelling state interest.267 
Indeed, “any classification which serves to penalize the 
exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote 
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.”268 
Brennan’s imposition of the compelling state interest 
standard, along with the narrow tailoring requirement, through 
the breezy and confident “[b]ut, of course” remark was belied, 
 
263 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 198 (1964).  See also Loving, 388
U.S. at 13 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 264 See Developments, supra note 41, at 1090-91 (saying the 
“overriding purpose” test rejects a “per se rule” and “will 
allow the courts more flexibility in appraising measures which 
have no discriminatory purpose”).  
 265 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 266 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633-64. 
 267 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. 
 268 Shapiro, 394 U.S. 634. 
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however, and its novelty was revealed by the fact that the 
authority he cited for his proposition were four cases269 which 
he introduced with the tellingly weak “Cf.” signal.270 
Given the novelty of Justice Brennan’s doctrine, Justice 
Stewart felt compelled to write a concurrence to specially 
defend the proposition that the “purposes ... offered in support 
of a law that so clearly impinges upon the constitutional right 
of interstate travel must be shown to reflect a compelling 
governmental interest.”271 Stewart was defending the doctrine 
from the elaborate attack contained in Justice Harlan’s 
dissent,272 and he drove his point home by quoting Harlan’s  
opinion for the Court in the 1958 First Amendment case, NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson:273 
As Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court more than a 
decade ago, ‘[T]o justify the deterrent effect ... on the 
free exercise ... of their constitutionally protected right 
 
269 The four cases were Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
406 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).  Sherbert and Bates, though of 
recent vintage, were First Amendment cases.  Korematsu and 
Skinner, though equal protection cases, were not particularly 
relevant, if only for the great hiatus between them and modern 
activism.  In addition, Skinner discussed neither narrow 
tailoring nor a compelling interest requirement.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 196-98.  On Korematsu, see supra text 
accompanying notes 199-214. 
 270 “Cf.” means the cited “authority supports a proposition 
different but sufficiently analogous to lend support.”  The 
Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation 47 (18th ed. 2005).  It is 
the weakest citation signal indicating support. Ira Robbins, 
Semiotics, Analogical Legal Reasoning, and the Cf. Citation: 
Getting Our Signals Uncrossed, 48 Duke L.J. 1043, 1045 (1999). 
 271 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643-44 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 272 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 642 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
Id. at 655-77 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 273 357 U.S. 449 (1958).  See supra text accompanying notes 
119-24 (discussing Patterson). 
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... a ... subordinating interest of the State must be 
compelling.’ 
 
The Court today, therefore, is not ‘contriving new 
constitutional principles.’  It is deciding these cases 
under the aegis of established constitutional law.274 
Two months later, the Court imported the compelling state 
interest standard into equal protection cases involving voting 
rights, Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.275 and Cipriano v. City 
of Houma .276 From there its spread within equal protection 
analysis, and throughout general legal consciousness, was 
rapid.277 
274 Shaprio, 394 U.S. at 644 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)). 
 275 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).  
In commenting on the Kramer case, the Harvard Law Review editors 
observed that “[i]t might be argued Kramer is the first case 
clearly to hold [voting rights] denials entail strict review” 
because prior cases only “purported to use a strict standard.”  
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Leading Cases, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 
62, 83 n. 26 (1969). 
 276 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). 
 277 To illustrate the spread, consider that prior to 1969, 
the term “compelling state interest” had been used in no equal 
protection cases and in only 6 cases, all of which involved the 
First Amendment.  Westlaw search using the string “compelling 
state interest” & date(bef 1969).  From 1969 to 1973, the term 
“compelling state interest” was used in 26 equal protection, due 
process, and first amendment cases.  Westlaw search using the 
string “compelling state interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974). 
 
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling governmental interest” 
had been used in only 2 cases, both of which involved the First 
Amendment. Westlaw search using the string “compelling state 
interest” & date(bef 1969).  From 1969 to 1973, the term 
“compelling governmental interest” was used in 12 equal 
protection, due process and equal protection cases.  Westlaw 
search using the string “compelling governmental interest” & 
date(aft 1968 & bef 1974). 
 
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling state interest” had 
been used in the Harvard Law Review in only 7 articles and 
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Ironically, racial classification was perhaps the last area 
of constitutional law expressly brought within the scope of the 
compelling state interest standard.278 In 1974, a student note 
in the Yale Law Journal maintained, accurately in my view, that 
the compelling interest standard was not part of strict scrutiny 
for suspect classifications.279 Not until Justice Douglas’s 
dissent from the dismissal on mootness grounds of the Court’s 
first affirmative action case did any Justice mention the 
“compelling state interest” standard in a case involving racial 
classification,280 and Douglas raised it only to argue that 
adopting the standard would be unfortunate.  As First Amendment 
cases had shown, adopting the compelling, rather than an 
absolute, standard would permit “those who hold the reins” to 
give “constitutional guarantees” an undesirable “accordionlike 
quality.”281 It was not until 1978, when affirmative action 
returned to the Court, that a racial classification case was 
decided by the principle that the government regulations must be  
 
notes.  Westlaw search using the string “compelling state 
interest” & date(bef 1969).  From 1969 to 1973, the term was 
used in 31 articles and notes.  Westlaw search using the string 
“compelling state interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974). 
 
Prior to 1969, the term “compelling governmental interest” 
had been used in the Harvard Law Review in only 1 note.  Westlaw 
search using the string “compelling governmental interest & 
date(bef 1969).  From 1969 to 1973, the term was used in 11 
articles and notes.  Westlaw search using the string “compelling 
governmental interest” & date(aft 1968 & bef 1974). 
 278 The tradition of reading the compelling interest as 
implicitly part of the law of race cases since Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and voting cases since 
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) 
may date from Justice Harlan’s dissent in Shaprio v. Thompson,
394 U.S. at 655 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting 
Korematsu and Harper). 
 279 Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-51. 
 280 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 341, 343 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 281 DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 343 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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“precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.”282 
In that case, Justice Powell spoke only for himself, even 
though he cast the deciding vote.  Thus, it was not until 1984, 
in Palmore v. Sidoti,283 that an opinion for the Court declared 
that “to pass constitutional muster” racial classifications 
“must be” both narrowly tailored and “justified by a compelling 
governmental interest.”284 
While not exactly the completion of the spread of the 
“compelling state interest” standard – it took another five 
years for the Court to decide to employ it in affirmative action 
cases285 – Palmore does provide a convenient stopping point.  By 
 
282 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke v. 438 
U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (per Powell, J.). 
 283 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 284 Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.  See also Crawford v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the City of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 536 (1982) 
(assuming racial classifications must promote a compelling state 
interest); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 
457, 482 n. 28 (1982) (same).  For the point that strict 
scrutiny was not employed in racial classification cases prior 
to the affirmative action cases consider that the typical list 
of cases from the 1950s and 1960s that scholars cite as voiding 
racial classifications on strict scrutiny grounds employed 
neither narrow tailoring nor the compelling state interest 
standard.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 4, at 1071 and n. 52 
(citing cases). 
 
Although alienage is frequently spoken of as a suspect 
classification requiring strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); E. Chemerinsky, supra note 
2, at 739-43, the cases evidence a weaker standard.  See, e.g., 
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) (narrow tailoring and 
“substantial” government interest); Examining Board v. Flores de 
Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (narrow tailoring and “substantial” 
interest); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (narrow 
tailoring and “substantial” interest, but saying that interest 
has been described in various ways, such as “compelling,” 
“important,” and “overriding”). 
 285 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  
Unlike Croson, Palmore, 466 U.S. at 429 involved an invidious 
racial classification that burdened African-Americans. 
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1984, the compelling state interest standard, and the strict 
scrutiny analysis of which it was an important part, not only 
were keystone doctrines of constitutional law, but finally were 
part of the Equal Protection Clause’s analysis of invidious 
racial classifications, which is where the conventional wisdom 
assumes they started.286 
IV. The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and the 
Purpose of Strict Scrutiny 
 
Ever since the Supreme Court decided to subject affirmative 
action legislation to strict scrutiny,287 there has been a stream 
of articles analyzing how that decision has altered the nature 
of this most stringent level of judicial review.288 One of the 
most frequently made claims is that the Supreme Court’s 
application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action has 
compelled the Court to change strict scrutiny’s underlying 
rationale.289 
According to the Supreme Court, strict scrutiny has two 
purposes.  It is, first of all, a device to “smoke out” illicit 
governmental motive.  As Justice O’Connor has written: 
 
286 For some discussion of the strict scrutiny’s subsequent 
history, as well as the history of heightened scrutiny in the 
Burger and Rehnquist courts, see Richard Brisbin, Jr. and Edward 
Heck, The Battle Over Strict Scrutiny: Coalition Conflict in the 
Rehnquist Court, 32 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1049 (1992); Ira Lupu, 
Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. 
Rev. 981, 998-1026 (1979).  
 287 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).  
 288 E.g., Michelle Adams, Searching for Strict Scrutiny in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 Tul. L. Rev. 1941, 1945-54 (2004); 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Affirmative Action and Compelling Interests: 
Equal Protection Jurisprudence at the Crossroads, 6 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 260, 272-79 (2002); Pamela Karlan, Easing the Spring:  
Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After the Redistricting 
Cases, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1569, 1573-94 (2002); Massey, supra 
note 3, at 975-80; Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale 
L.J. 427, 428, 436-44 (1997). 
 289 See infra text accompanying notes 292-95. 
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the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" 
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative 
body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of 
a highly suspect tool.  The test also ensures that the 
means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that 
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or 
stereotype.290 
290 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).  
See also Johnson v. California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1142, 1146 
(2005) (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (same); Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 
225 (1995) (same). 
 
As elaborated by Elena Kagan in the context of the First 
Amendment speech clause, the argument is:  
 
the strict scrutiny standard--indeed, each component of it-
- is best understood as an evidentiary device that allows 
the government to disprove the implication of improper 
motive .... This is true first of the compelling interest 
requirement: the stronger the state interest asserted, the 
more likely it is that the government would act to achieve 
that interest in the absence of antipathy toward the 
speech. Similar reasoning applies to the demand for close 
tailoring. If a restriction applies to more speech than 
necessary to achieve the interest asserted, the suspicion 
deepens that the government is attempting to quash ideas as 
ideas rather than to promote a legitimate interest. And if 
a restriction applies to less speech than implicates the 
asserted interest, so too the concern grows that the 
interest asserted is a pretext.  But if a restriction fits 
along both dimensions--if it applies to all and also to 
only the speech that threatens the asserted interest--then 
there is an assurance that the government has acted for 
proper reasons. In this way, the strict scrutiny test 
operates as a measure of governmental motive. The showing 
that the government must make under that standard does not 
serve, as on a scale, to outweigh impermissible motive or 
counter its harms. The showing instead serves an 
evidentiary function: to disprove (again, of necessity 
indirectly) the inference of bad motive that arises from 
the ... face of a law. 
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In addition, strict scrutiny is a tool to determine whether 
there is a cost-benefit justification for governmental action 
that burdens interests for which the Constitution demands 
unusually high protection.  Again, as Justice O’Connor has 
written: 
 
[W]henever the government treats any person unequally 
because of his or her race, that person has suffered an 
injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit 
of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection .... 
The application of strict scrutiny ... determines whether a 
compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction 
of that injury.291 
Scholars agree that the Court has used strict scrutiny for 
both these purposes.292 However, they see “smoking out” as 
strict scrutiny’s original purpose and the cost-benefit 
rationale as a recent shift in strict scrutiny’s underlying 
principle brought about by the Court’s determination to subject 
affirmative action legislation to its highest and most rigid 
level of review.293 Scholars disagree on whether to condemn or 
 
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of 
Government Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 413, 453-54 (1996) (discussing strict scrutiny for First 
Amendment liberties).  See also, Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 
436 (discussing strict scrutiny for suspect classifications). 
 291 Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995).  As restated 
by Jed Rubenfeld, the Court’s position is that “strict scrutiny 
can be justified ... as a justificatory test – a test measuring 
whether ... constitutional costs are justified in a given case 
by offsetting social benefits.”  Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 
439.  See also Adams, supra note 288, at 1943 (“balance society 
benefits against potential societal harms that are created by an 
affirmative action plan”). 
 292 E.g., Adams, supra note 288, at 1943; Kim Forde-Mazrui, 
The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative 
Action," 88 Geo. L.J. 2331, 2359-64 (2000); Rubenfeld, supra 
note 288, at 428, 436-44. 
 293 Adams, supra note 288, at 1943-44 (discussing a shift 
from an “antisubjugation” to an “antidiscrimination” rationale); 
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 437-38.  The view that discovery 
of illicit motive is the original purpose of strict scrutiny 
predates the controversy over its use in recent affirmative 
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commend this development.294 But whether they approve or 
disapprove of the shift, scholars concur that “smoking out” was 
the original raison d’etre of strict scrutiny and the 
“balancing” approach is a recent shift.295 
This Article shows, however, that strict scrutiny’s 
development is more complex than the standard account.  Tracing 
the roots of strict scrutiny into the First Amendment when 
balancing of interests was its paradigmatic form of legal 
thought suggests that “cost-justification” was its original 
point.  Balancing of interests essentially is a jurisprudence of 
cost-benefit analysis, not motive discovery.  When the Court 
introduced narrow tailoring and the compelling state interest 
standard into First Amendment analysis, it did so as part of its 
general “balancing / cost-benefit justification” approach to 
First Amendment questions.296 Indeed, the Court’s more 
absolutist Justices, Black and Douglas, concurred rather than 
joined in some of the early decisions employing strict scrutiny 
in the First Amendment because, in their view, no “objective can 
ever be weighed against an express [constitutional] limitation 
on the means available for its pursuit.”297 
decisions.  See Simon, supra note 4, at 1067-76 (saying strict 
scrutiny is a system to discover improper motive).  
 294 See Adams, supra note 288, at 1946-47 (commending); 
Forde-Mizrui, supra note 292, at 2363-64 (commending); 
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 440 (condemning). 
 295 But see Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of “Benign” 
Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 
559, 565 n. 41 (1975) (citing seminal strict scrutiny cases for 
the proposition that “in some suspect classification cases, the 
Court has weighed ends, even though it has not been explicit 
about what it is doing”). 
 296 See Aleinikoff, supra note 227, at 966-67; Siegel, 
Death, supra note 17, at * (discussing the cases); infra text 
accompanying note 300 (discussing narrow tailoring and 
Schneider). 
 297 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 
372 U.S. 539, 566 (1963) (Douglas J., concurring)(quoting 
Frantz, supra note 111, at 1441).  See also id. at 558 (Black, 
J., concurring) (expressing agreement with Douglas’s opinion); 
Bates v. Little Rock, 316 U.S. 516, 528 (Black, J., and Douglas, 
J., concurring) (saying “First Amendment rights are beyond 
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Black and Douglas were correct to understand strict 
scrutiny, when it was first formulated, as a form of cost-
benefit analysis.  Consider, for example, Schneider v. Town of 
Irvington,298 which is both a seminal First Amendment balancing 
case299 and one of the cases that introduced narrow tailoring 
into First Amendment analysis.300 Narrow tailoring was used in 
Schneider for cost-justification purposes.301 In Schneider, the
abridgment”).  Gibson, supra, is particularly important as it is 
one of the seminal cases in which the new Warren Court majority 
used a true strict scrutiny standard.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 172-81 (discussing Gibson). 
 
See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, 
J., and Douglas, J., concurring) (objecting to the idea that 
“some overriding statutory purpose” might validate a racial 
classification); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13 (Stewart, 
J., concurring) (reiterating his McLaughlin concurrence)  
 298 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 299 Aleinikoff, supra note 227, at 966-67 & n. 146; Frantz, 
supra note 111, at 1425, 1431; White, supra note 11, at 333; 
Louis Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 
78 Colum. L. Rev. 1022, 1045, n. 120 (1978). 
 300 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1864) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (Schneider is earliest cite given for narrow 
tailoring principle in First Amendment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (same); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 
492-94 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (same); Wormuth and Mirkin, 
supra note 45, at 272.  
 301 Because Schneider is commonly regarded as a Jehovah’s 
Witness case, e.g., Patrick Flynn, “Writing Their Faith into the 
Laws of the Land”, 10 Tex. J. Civ. Lib. & Civ Rts. 1, 10, 13 
(2004); White, supra note 11, at 333, there may appear the 
possibility of asserting, regardless of the Court’s express 
analysis, that the case involved a concern for smoking out 
illicit motive regarding that unpopular religion.  Schneider,
however, was a consolidated case involving different handbill 
ordinances from four disparate municipalities.  Of the four 
defendants, only Clara Schneider was a Witness.  The other cases 
involved the “Friends of the Lincoln Bridgade,” a “labor 
picket,” and someone protesting “the administration of State 
unemployment insurance.” Schneider, 308 U.S. at 154-57.  Only by 
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Court specifically accepted the municipality’s claim that it was 
banning handbilling as a means to prevent littering, but said 
that purpose was “insufficient to justify” banning a traditional 
means of communication given the existence of other means to 
solve the littering problem.302 Similarly, Talley v. 
California,303 which is among the cases that revived First 
Amendment narrow tailoring in the 1960s, was also a balancing, 
not a motive discovery, case.304 
The same is true of the compelling state interest standard: 
It was introduced for cost-benefit justification, not motive 
 
the happenstance of case naming is that adjudication thought of 
as a Witness case. 
 
Moreover, the cases being discussed in the pages where 
narrow tailoring was introduced and applied are the three cases 
that did not involve Clara Schneider.  Id. at 162.  Thus, it 
seems fair to accept the Court’s express pronouncement that the 
“motive of the legislation under attack” in those three cases 
was the legitimate motive of “the prevention of littering of the 
streets.”  Id. 
 302 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 162. 
 303 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 304 See Talley, 362 U.S. at 63-64 (mentioning various 
factors that affect the outcome); id. at 65 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (saying “I do not believe that we can escape, as Mr. 
Justice Roberts said in Schneider ... 'the delicate and 
difficult task' of weighing 'the circumstances' and appraising 
'the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the 
regulation of the free enjoyment of' speech”); id. at 69 (Clark, 
J., dissenting) (speaking of “weigh[ing] the interests of the 
public ... against the claimed right of Talley”).   
 
I do not rely on Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), 
which is conventionally cited as the seminal modern narrow 
tailoring case.  Shelton, like Talley, speaks entirely in terms 
of costs and benefits.  Shelton, supra, at 489-90.  
Nevertheless, Shelton’s underlying facts involve a southern 
legislature attempting to expose NAACP membership among public 
school teachers.  See L. Powe, supra note 49, at 168-69 
(discussing Shelton).  Because of the underlying facts, there is 
at least a possibility that the Court, without mentioning it, 
was influenced by a doubt about the legislature’s motive.  
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discovery purposes.  Justice Frankfurter, who introduced the 
concept to constitutional law,305 was not prone to concern 
himself with legislative motive.306 Moreover, in Sweezy,
Frankfurter’s determination that the importance of academic 
freedom left it uniquely beyond the reach of legislative 
questioning, “except for reasons that are exigent and obviously 
compelling,”307 was predicated entirely on a balancing 
analysis.308 Similarly, Sherbert v. Verner,309 the case that 
completed the process of introducing the compelling state 
interest standard into First Amendment law,310 was a case in 
which there was no intimation that state officials had a hidden 
illicit motive.311 
305 See supra text accompanying notes 69, 85-87 (discussing 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire). 
 306 See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468-69 
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (saying legislative motive 
“not open to judicial probing”); Communist Party v. SACB, 367 
U.S. 1, 86 (1961) (“So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its 
constitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene 
on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that 
power”) (quotation marks removed); Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
376, 377 (1951) (saying it is “not consonant with our scheme of 
government for a court to inquire into the motives of 
legislators”); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948) 
(“We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the 
mind of Michigan legislators nor question their motives”). 
 307 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 308 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261, 266 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (speaking of “weigh[ing]” the government’s 
justification against the harm resulting from its “intrusion 
into the intellectual life a university” and of “balancing two 
contending principles”). 
 309 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 310 See supra text accompanying notes 182-89 (discussing 
Sherbert). 
 311 See Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 443 n. 62 criticizing 




Moreover, that strict scrutiny was formulated for cost-
justification and not for motive discovery purposes is suggested 
by another facet of constitutional jurisprudence in the 1950s 
and early 1960s.  Throughout the years that strict scrutiny was 
gestating in First Amendment litigation, the Court’s general 
rule was that governmental motive was “irrelevant” to questions 
of governmental power.312 That rule did not begin to change 
until the early 1960s, when the Court “adjust[ed] constitutional 
... doctrine[] in response” to the South’s “intransigence ... 
disingenuousness .... endless evasion and bad faith” in 
desegregation and racial classification cases.313 Gomillion v. 
Lightfoot314 and Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward 
County315 were the breakthrough cases in which the Court began to 
take legislative motivation into account.316 
The view that smoking out illicit motive was the original 
purpose of strict scrutiny arose for two reasons.  First there 
was a politico-jurisprudential imperative.  If strict scrutiny 
is a cost-justification device, the Justices who employ it are 
not acting as neutral observers merely seeking to determine if 
the legislature had a purpose that everyone would regard as 
 
Brennan did point out that the state unemployment 
compensation scheme contained a discrimination in favor of 
Sunday worship “in times of ‘national emergency’”.  Sherbert, 
374 U.S. at 406.  But that part of the law had no application to 
Sherbert’s claim. 
 312 John Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1208 (1970); See also M. 
Klarman, supra note 98, at 340 (“in 1960, the weight of 
authority still rejected judicial inquiries into legislative 
motive”). 
 313 M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 342.  See also Ely, 
Legislative, supra note 312, at 1209 (saying it was “no great 
surprise” that the Court “turned to the analysis of motivation” 
in the desegregation struggle).    
 314 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 315 377 U.S. 218 (1964). 
 316 M. Klarman, supra note 98, at 340, 342; Ely, 
Legislative, supra note 312, at 1209 (discussing Establishment 
Clause precedent also). 
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improper.  They are overruling the legislative determination 
that the benefit to society brought about by burdening a 
protected right is worth it in the particular instance.  
Although many contemporary Justices foreswear second-guessing 
legislatures, the high-protectionist Justices who developed our 
current generous protections for First Amendment values, and 
invented strict scrutiny, were comfortable with that activity.  
They thought it the essence of their role.317 
It is no accident that John Ely was the first 
constitutional theorist to rest strict scrutiny on ferreting out 
illicit motive.318 Cost-benefit analysis, which inevitably 
involves judicial second-guessing of a legislature’s or 
executive branches’s balance among competing policy interests, 
was anathema to Ely’s political process approach to 
constitutional law.319 In other words, a large part of the 
appeal of strict scrutiny’s “smoking out” rationale has been its 
ability to allow the Court to appear value-free.  According to 
 
317 M. Shapiro, supra note 49, at 77; Kenneth Karst, The 
First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the 
Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 10 (1965).  
 318 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48.  Ely’s 
grounding of strict scrutiny in discovering illicit motive, 
rather than cost-benefit analysis, traces at least to 1971.  See 
John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974) (citing John Ely, 
Judicial Review of Suspicious Classifications (Spring, 1971) 
(unpublished manuscript).  Many contemporary discussions trace 
back to Ely.  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 288, at 1945 n. 28; 
Rubenfeld, supra note 288, at 436 n. 48. 
 319 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 44-48, 165-66; 
Michael Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process 
Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747, 772 (1991) (saying political process 
theory’s “basic notion is that the political process is subject 
to certain systemic flaws, and that judicial review should be 
directed at remedying those situations rather than 
superintending the outcomes of a properly functioning democratic 
system”).  For this reason, Ely opposed the fundamental interest 
branch of strict scrutiny, except for voting rights.  J. Ely, 
Democracy, supra note 10, at 1-72, 116-25, 247-49 n. 52.  Ely 
favored active judicial protection of free speech, but he did 
not discuss that protection in terms of strict scrutiny.  Id. at 
105-16. 
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the “smoking out” rationale, all the Court is doing when it 
applies strict scrutiny is the politically neutral task of 
determining that no illicit purpose motivated the government 
action at bar. 
 
The second reason for the view that smoking out illicit 
motive is strict scrutiny’s original rationale is the belief 
that strict scrutiny originated in the Warren Court’s racial 
discrimination cases.320 Although strict scrutiny can be, and 
has been, used as a cost-benefit justification device, the 
Warren Court did not use it that way in its racial 
discrimination cases.  After the Warren Court’s high-
protectionist majority employed strict scrutiny in a number a 
First Amendment cases in 1963, its heightened scrutiny of racial 
discrimination cases involved the slow, piecemeal migration of 
strict scrutiny into the Equal Protection Clause.  Beginning in 
1964, the Warren Court integrated narrow tailoring into the 
equal protection clause, but not the compelling state interest 
standard.321 
In those cases, narrow tailoring was employed to 
demonstrate that the laws at bar were part of the system of 
White Supremacy, an illicit motive if ever the Warren Court saw 
one.322 Cost-benefit analysis was not necessary to decide those 
 
320 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48; Rubenfeld, 
supra note 288, at 453-59; Simon, supra note 4, at 1067-71; 
Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-52. 
 321 See supra text accompanying notes 237-64. 
 322 Given the Court’s newly adopted view that racial 
segregation was no longer a reasonable exercise of the police 
power, Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 229-30, 254-55, 
illicit motive analysis in these cases provided the most 
generally acceptable grounds for the decision.  During this 
time, the Court upheld lower court decisions permitting racial 
segregation in municipal holding cells where drunks were placed 
until they sobered up, Lee, supra, and allowing states to 
require divorce decrees to state the race of the parties, Tancil 
v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964).  As these were Per Curiam 
decisions, whether the results were based on a motive or 
balancing analysis is impossible to say. 
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cases.323 Uncovering illicit motive provided the Warren Court 
with an easy and sufficient ratio decidendi.324 
The Warren Court’s focus, in such racial discrimination 
cases as McLaughlin v. Florida325 and Loving v. Virginia,326 on 
demonstrating illicit motive rather than the absence of cost-
justification, helps account for that Court’s failure to import 
the compelling state interest standard into its racial 
discrimination cases.  A “compelling” state interest standard is 
too demanding to function simply as a means to ferret out covert 
illicit motive.  As John Ely, who first explained the connection 
between smoking out and equal protection’s increased demand for 
the strength of the state’s justification, said: 
 
[E]ven a perfect fit between the classification in issue 
and the goal the state is arguing shouldn’t be enough to 
allay your initial suspicion if that goal is so unimportant 
that you have to suspect it’s a pretext that didn’t 
actually generate the choice. ... There may be nothing 
 
323 Cost-benefit analysis was not entirely absent.  See 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (explaining why he agreed with the Court’s use of 
the narrow tailoring principle, which “arose under the 
principles of the First Amendment,” to decide an equal 
protection case, and citing cases which illustrate the cost-
benefit rationale for narrow tailoring).  See also Klarman, 
Interpretive, supra note 10, at 256-57, 296 (saying the Warren 
Court had no need, and did not, choose between the smoking out 
and cost-benefit rationales of heightened scrutiny in its racial 
classification cases). 
 324 See Karlan, supra note 288, at 1569, 1571 n. 13 (saying 
that for the Warren Court “rational basis review” had been 
sufficient to “eradicat[e] explicit racial classifications”).  
Had the Court suggested reliance on the cost-benefit 
understanding of heightened scrutiny its unanimity may have 
fractured.  At this time, there were three to four Justices who 
opposed any suggestion that the racial classifications could be 
justified by a balancing analysis, at least when criminal 
sanctions were involved.  See supra note 322 (discussing Lee,
McLaughlin, and Tancil). 
 325 379 U.S. 184 (1964).   
 326 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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wrong with the fit, but the goal is so trivial in context 
that you have to believe that it’s a rationalization for a 
racially motivated choice.327 
And after giving the example of temporarily separating the races 
during a prison race riot, he went on to “functionally” define 
the “compelling” standard “in terms of whether the claim that it 
was the actual motivation is credible.”328 
Ely’s point, therefore, may be satisfied by state interests 
that, while more than trivial, are less than compelling.329 To
327 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 147-48.  See also, 
Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1251 (drawing from Ely’s 
unpublished manuscript on suspect classifications, see supra 
note 318, to say that the compelling interest standard is 
inappropriate in suspect classification cases where the Court is 
concerned with “purity of process” rather than substance; for 
this reason, the compelling standard is appropriate for 
fundamental rights cases). 
 328 Id. At 148. See also, 148 n. 46 (citing other scholars 
and discussing other examples).  But see Paul Brest, Forward: In 
Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 
15 n. 65 (1976) (defending the stringent standard on prophylaxis 
grounds).  Prophylaxis as a justification for the compelling 
interest standard puts the error cost of not spotting a 
government decision based on illicit motive on the state rather 
than the individual.  This justification understands the 
compelling standard as a cost-benefit supplement to the smoking 
out ability of a demand for a credible justification. 
 329 In other words, what has come to be called intermediate 
scrutiny functions fairly well as a test to smoke out illicit 
government motive.  This is what the Court has done with 
intermediate scrutiny in the gender classification cases, the 
best account of which reflects a search for whether the 
government’s action reflects real differences between men and 
women or traditional sex roles and gender stereotypes.  See, 
e.g., Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 
53, 62-67 (2001); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 n. 24 
(1983); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 
724-25, 729 (1982); id. at 736, 740-41, 743 (Powell, J., 
dissenting; E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 737-38.   
 
The success of intermediate scrutiny suggests that strict 
scrutiny, with its compelling interest requirement, may well be 
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satisfy the smoking out rationale, what we need is a state 
interest that is sufficiently important to “allay[]” the 
“suspicion of racially prejudiced behavior.”330 That, of course, 
tracks what the Warren Court was doing in the mid- to late-
1960s,331 as it, for example, struck down racial designations of 
candidates on election ballots,332 but not racial designations on 
vital records.333 In its race discrimination cases, the Warren 
 
reserved for situations where the court is concerned not only 
with the government’s motive, but also with second-guessing the 
social costs and benefits of what the government has done 
regardless of motive. 
 
This analysis tracks historical development.  As this 
Article shows, the Court imported the compelling state interest 
standard into racial discrimination cases when it turned to 
affirmative action cases.  See supra text accompanying notes 
285-88.  It was at that point that the Court began to review the 
legislation not only for motivation, but for its cost-benefit 
justification.  See supra text accompanying note 293. 
 330 J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 247 n. 46.  As Ely 
continued,  
 
Yes, it will inevitably involve balancing, but balancing 
with a standard, whether what the state is now arguing 
really could have been the motivation. 
 
Id.  See also, Simon, supra note 4, at 1071 (saying the state’s 
interest must be “so important that we can with some confidence 
draw the inference that reasonable decisionmakers would have 
taken the challenged action whether they were affected by racial 
prejudice”). 
 331 Ely was writing to justify the ways of the Warren Court 
to the legal academy.  Ely dedicated his book:  “For Earl 
Warren.  You don’t need many heroes if you choose carefully.”  
J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at v. 
 332 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).  
 333 Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), aff’g Hamm v. 
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.Va. 
1964).  See also Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1515 n. 158 
and accompanying text (discussing Martin and Tancil); Simon, 
supra note 4, at 1075 (same).  See also Greenawalt, supra note 
295, at 565 n. 41 (saying “in some suspect classification cases 
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Court was looking for acceptable state goals, goals of 
sufficient weight to allay the suspicion of racial prejudice.334 
The belief that modern strict scrutiny originated in the 
Warren Court’s racial discrimination cases leads to the 
misconception that strict scrutiny originated as a means to 
ferret out illicit motive.335 But if strict scrutiny is a 
doctrine that requires both narrow tailoring and a compelling 
state interest, it not only did not begin in the Warren Court’s 
racial discrimination cases, it was never used in them.336 
Modern strict scrutiny began in First Amendment cases337 and 
 
the [Warren] Court has weighed ends, even though it has not been 
explicit about what it is doing”). 
 334 In other words, in its racial discrimination cases, the 
Warren Court was not looking for compelling state interests and 
never said it was.  See Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1245-52 
(explaining suspect classification review as a search for narrow 
tailoring and a permissible purpose). 
 335 See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy, supra note 10, at 145-48 
(discussing strict scrutiny’s rationale but only discussing 
racial discrimination cases).  Ely’s more extended discussion of 
strict scrutiny embraced only suspect classifications, id. at 
148-72. 
 336 The Warren Court certainly employed heightened 
scrutiny, as I have defined it, see supra text accompanying note 
24, in that the Court subjected racial classifications to close 
analysis, sometimes by requiring narrow tailoring, McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and sometimes by carefully parsing 
the facts, Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 536-38 (1963).  See 
also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (racial 
motive may be shown by the effect of a legislatively imposed 
change in municipal boundaries).  See also Klarman, 
Interpretive, supra note 10, at 254-56 (saying the Warren Court 
did not adopt a “presumptive rule against racial 
classifications” until McLaughlin); Note, Mental, supra note 
247, at 1251-52 (observing that in racial classification cases, 
the Court required narrow tailoring and permissible, not 
compelling state interest). 
 337 See supra text accompanying notes 49-189. 
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migrated to the fundamental rights branch of equal protection at 
the very end of the Warren Court.338 
Tracing strict scrutiny’s roots back to First Amendment 
narrow tailoring cases in the 1940s339 and compelling interest 
cases in the 1950s and early 1960s,340 establishes strict 
scrutiny as part of a constitutional paradigm in which, even for 
high-protectionist Justices, no constitutional right was “beyond 
limitation,”341 and none could prevail over an appropriate 
subordinating governmental interest.342 As Justice Rutledge 
wrote in Thomas v. Collins,343 in 1945, it was a paradigm in 
which for a few preferred rights “[o]nly the gravest abuses, 
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible 
limitation.”344 That was a formula for cost-benefit 
 
338 See supra text accompanying notes 265-84. 
 339 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48, 298-300 
(discussing narrow tailoring). 
 340 See supra text accompanying notes 49-189 (discussing 
the compelling standard). 
 341 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) 
(speaking of rights of religion and parenthood).  Justice 
Rutledge, who wrote the opinion in Prince, was one of the 1940s 
most civil libertarian Justices.  See Mendelson, Clear, supra 
note 52, at 320 (associating an “era par excellence of civil 
liberties” with Rutledge’s tenure on the bench).  See also 
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 603 (Stone, 
C.J., dissenting) (“In ... cases ... where there are competing 
demands of the interests of government and of liberty under the 
Constitution, and where the performance of governmental 
functions is brought into conflict with specific constitutional 
restrictions, there must, when that is possible, be reasonable 
accommodation between them so as to preserve the essentials of 
both and that it is the function of courts to determine whether 
such accommodation is reasonably possible”). 
 342 See, e.g., Price, 321 U.S. at 166; Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944). 
 343 323 U.S. 516 (1945). 
 344 Thomas, 323 US at 530.  See also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944)(saying “[p]ressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of [race-based] 
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justification.  And when Justice Brennan quoted Rutledge’s 
remark in Sherbert v. Verner,345 he announced the birth of modern 
strict scrutiny. 
 
V. Conclusion: The Origin of The Compelling State Interest 
 Test and the “Core Value” of the Equal Protection 
Clause 
 
Strict scrutiny, defined by the dual requirements of narrow 
tailoring and the compelling state interest test, originated in 
the First Amendment.  Beginning in 1963, and for the remainder 
of the Warren Court’s tenure, strict scrutiny was among the many 
doctrines by which the Warren Court gave the freedoms of speech, 
press, and religion substantial protection from government 
interference.  At that time, strict scrutiny did not play as 
prominent a part in First Amendment jurisprudence as it would in 
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, but it certainly was among 
the Warren Court’s doctrinal resources. 
 
The “compelling interest” branch of strict scrutiny can be 
traced in First Amendment litigation back to 1957.  It first 
appeared in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire,346 and was employed in six opinions for the Court 
before 1963.347 In those cases, however, the “compelling 
 
restrictions ; id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting)(saying “[t]he 
judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military 
necessity, can validly deprive an individual of any of his 
constitutional rights is whether the deprivation is reasonably 
related to a public danger that is so immediate, imminent, and 
impending as not to admit of delay”) (internal quotation marks 
removed).  
 345 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas, 323 U.S. at 
530).  
 346 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 347 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); 
Scull v. Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Commitee on Law Reform 
and Racial Activities, 359 U.S. 344, 352 (1959); Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 
U.S. 72, 79-81 (1959); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 
(1958); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 
(1958).  It was also used in another concurrence, Talley v. 
California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring), and 
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interest” test was not part of a true strict scrutiny standard.  
But if this latter claim is wrong, it only means that the 
compelling state interest test and strict scrutiny originated in 
First Amendment litigation even earlier than 1963. 
 In other words, if strict scrutiny in First Amendment 
litigation dates back to 1957, it only amplifies this Article’s 
most important finding:  that the compelling state interest 
standard and strict scrutiny was an established aspect of First 
Amendment jurisprudence before their appearance in the Equal 
Protection Clause in 1969.348 
When strict scrutiny did appear in Equal Protection Clause 
litigation, it was confined to cases which involved legislation 
that burdened fundamental interests.  Strict scrutiny did not 
appear in equal protection racial discrimination cases until 
1978.  In that year, Justice Powell, who was not speaking for 
the Court, employed strict scrutiny in casting the deciding vote 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.349 It was 
not until 1984 that an opinion for the Court employed strict 
scrutiny in a racial discrimination case.350 
It is true that the Court first employed “narrow 
tailoring,” which is part of the doctrine of strict scrutiny, in 
deciding the landmark racial discrimination cases, McLaughlin v. 
Florida351 and Loving v. Virginia,352 in 1964 and 1967 
respectively.  Due to the Court’s use of narrow tailoring, in 
McLaughlin and Loving, as well as its announcement that 
 
a dissent Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961) (Brennan, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
 348 See supra text accompanying notes 265-77 (discussing 
Cipriano v. City of Houma,395 U.S. 701 (1969); Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); and Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)). 
 349 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke v. 438 
U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (per Powell, J). 
 350 Supra text accompanying note 283-84 (discussing Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984)). 
 351 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 352 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
79
legislatures need “some overriding statutory purpose”353 in order 
to enact legislation with facial racial classifications, 
scholars have described those cases as seminal instances of 
strict scrutiny.354 But even if strict scrutiny in Equal 
Protection Clause litigation dates to McLaughlin in 1964, it 
still post-dates strict scrutiny’s gestation and appearance in 
First Amendment controversies between 1957 and 1963. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to insist that McLaughlin and 
Loving are instances of heightened, but not strict, scrutiny.  
Acknowledging that McLaughlin and Loving employed only part of 
modern strict scrutiny is essential for understanding the drawn 
out and piecemeal migration of the branches of strict scrutiny 
into the Equal Protection Clause. It helps explain why 
commentators have mistakenly believed that smoking out illicit 
motive was the original purpose of strict scrutiny.355 It also 
highlights an important aspect of Supreme Court jurisprudence: 
that the Court, in creating doctrine to guide decisionmaking by 
 
353 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 192.  See also Loving, 388 U.S. 
11 (same). 
 354 Klarman, Interpretive, supra note 10, at 296; Siegel, 
Equality, supra note 23, at 1502-03. 
 355 See supra text accompanying notes 237-64 (discussing 
the absence of of the compelling interest requirement in the 
Warren Court’s race discrimination decisions); J. Ely, 
Democracy, supra note 10, at 147-48 (describing the increased 
burden of justification on the state as requiring narrow 
tailoring and a “credible” state interest). 
 
Perhaps, in light of the comments in the remainder of this 
paragraph I should not say in this article that cost-
justification was the original purpose of strict scrutiny, but 
only that it was the original purpose of strict scrutiny for 
fundamental interests.  In suspect classification cases, 
heightened scrutiny’s original purpose was illicit motive 
discovery.  In other words, the two main branches of strict 
scrutiny, fundamental interests and suspect classifications, 
were fashioned to serve different goals.  See Note, Mental, 
supra note 247, at 1251 (explaining the compelling interest 
test’s absence from suspect classification cases on ground that 
in suspect classification cases the Court is interested in 
motive not substance). 
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the lower courts, is often more particularistic than 
commentators recognize.356 
Although commentators write of a doctrine of strict 
scrutiny that applies to suspect classifications and fundamental 
interests,357 the Supreme Court seems to have created a variety 
of heightened scrutinies, one for fundamental interests and 
another for suspect classifications.  Until the Burger and 
Rehnquist Court’s affirmative action decisions, heightened 
scrutiny of suspect classifications358 was used to ferret out 
illicit motive while strict scrutiny of fundamental interests 
focused on cost-justification.359 
Even the categories “suspect classifications” and 
“fundamental interests” may be too broad.  Although alienage is 
regarded, along with race, as a suspect classification,360 the 
burden of justification in alienage cases, as settled in the 
1970s, requires narrow tailoring and a “substantial” state 
interest.361 That standard is a mixture of elements of strict 
and intermediate scrutiny.362 
356 But see, e.g, Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 46, 48-54 (1987) (within the 
First Amendment’s content-based / content-neutral framework 
spotting seven different formulations for content neutral review 
which belies the commentators’ two-tiered approach).  See also 
Frederick Schauer, Comment: Principles, Institutions, and the 
First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 85-86, 108-113 (1998) 
(discussing the tension between the desire to adjudicate cases 
by applying abstract categories or individuated considerations). 
 357 See, e.g., E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 646, 648-
49, 668, 739-42, 762-63, 767. 
 358 I say heightened scrutiny because this Article reserves 
the term “strict scrutiny” for the doctrine that has both the 
narrow tailoring and compelling interest requirements.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 24, 37. 
 359 See Note, Mental, supra note 247, at 1251 (spotting the 
differential treatment of the two branches of strict scrutiny 
and saying they serve different purposes). 
 360 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 
(1971); E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 739-43. 
 361 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977) 
(narrow tailoring and “substantial” government interest); 
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As for fundamental interests, a recent article by Adam 
Winkler shows that governmental action survives strict scrutiny 
far more than is realized and that the survival rates differ 
among subject areas.363 Averaging 30%, between 1990 and 2003 the 
survival rate for legislation burdening the free exercise of 
religion is 59%, while free speech restrictions prevail 22% of 
the time.364 This suggests that the stringency of strict 
scrutiny, and therefore the doctrine itself, varies from area to 
area. 
 
Finally, acknowledging the delayed migration of the 
compelling interest standard into the Equal Protection Clause 
sheds light on a significant aspect of Fourteenth Amendment 
history.  As Reva Siegel has demonstrated, the Warren Court 
conceived the constitutional violation redressed in Brown v. 
Board of Education as a racial classification that harmed a 
 
Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (narrow 
tailoring and “substantial” interest); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717, 722 (1973) (narrow tailoring and “substantial” interest, 
but saying that interest has been described in various ways, 
such as “compelling,” “important,” and “overriding”). 
 362 See E. Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 645 (discussing 
strict and intermediate scrutiny).  Recognizing that a variety 
of approaches have traditionally fit under the strict scrutiny 
umbrella may enhance our understanding of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) which 
applies strict scrutiny to racial classifications in the context 
of University admissions with unusual deference to the views of 
governmental decisionmakers.  Id. at 328.  See also Johnson v. 
California, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 1157 (2005) (Thomas, J., joined by 
Scalia, J., dissenting) (saying they would accord prison 
officials such deference that strict scrutiny should not apply 
to racial classifications in prison).  
 363 Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An 
Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, ___ 
Vand. L. Rev. ___ (2006) (forthcoming) (SSRN file name: 
SSRN_ID897360_code109222.pdf) 
 364 Winkler, supra note 363, at 15, 17.  The survival rate 
of freedom of association restrictions is 33%, while fundamental 
rights restrictions survive 24% of the time.  Id. at 17.  
Winkler also found that suspect classification discrimination is 
upheld in 27% of the cases.  Id. 
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traditionally subordinated minority.365 According to Professor 
Siegel, it was the politics of defending Brown against massive 
Southern resistance and critical scholarly commentary that drove 
the Court, in the early 1960s, to begin pursuing its struggle 
against the historic subordination of African-Americans through 
less politically controversial rhetoric.366 That new rhetoric 
spoke of the presumptive unconstitutionality of racial 
classifications per se, not of the evil of racial subordination; 
it was a rhetoric of individual rights, not group rights.367 
To be sure, it was not until the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts’ attack on affirmative action, in the late 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s, that the Court found in the Equal Protection Clause a 
firm principle – the “colorblind Constitution”368 – that 
proscribed racial classifications even when their purpose and 
effect was to benefit historically oppressed minorities.  
Although it was the Burger and Rehnquist Court that turned the 
Equal Protection Clause from an anti-racial-subordination into 
an anti-racial-classification provision, it was the Warren 
Court’s politically “cautious”369 rhetoric in McLaughlin and 
Loving that laid the groundwork. 
 
In Reva Siegel’s view, McLaughlin and Loving are important 
transitional cases that initiated the shift in the Court’s 
vision of the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause from the 
norm of antisubordination to the norm of anticlassification.370 
According to Professor Siegel, the Court that decided Brown
conceived the constitutional problem of Jim Crow as a system of 
 
365 Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1480-89. 
 366 Id. at 1500-05. 
 367 Id. at 1472-76. 
 368 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens." (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. dissenting)));   
 369 Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1502. 
 370 For the comments in this paragraph, see Siegel, 
Equality, supra note 23, at 1500-05 (discussing McLaughlin and 
Loving). 
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laws that demeaned and subordinated minorities.  It was not 
until McLaughlin and Loving that the Court began treating racial 
classification simpliciter as the gist of the constitutional 
wrong.  In McLaughlin, the Court for the first time treated 
racial classification as “presumptively unconstitutional.”371 In
Loving, the Court voided an anti-miscegenation law both because 
it “enforced a system of racial hierarchy”372 and because it 
violated the Constitution’s newly announced presumptive bar to 
racial classifications.  Together, McLaughlin and Loving show 
the Court “revising its doctrinal framework” to be more 
politically cautious, while not entirely “abandon[ing] the 
concern with status harm that animated Brown.”373 Responding to 
political resistance, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence 
was in transition.  In McLaughlin and Loving, the Court’s 
anticlassification talk was still being driven by  
antisubordination theory.  It was not until the Burger and 
Rehnquist courts that colorblindness, rather than preventing 
harm to racial minorities, became the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
core value. 
 
Professor Siegel’s nuanced analysis correlates with this 
Article’s observation that in McLaughlin and Loving the Court 
imported narrow tailoring but not the compelling interest 
standard into the Equal Protection Clause’s analysis of racial 
discrimination cases.  When the Warren Court imported narrow 
tailoring into the Equal Protection Clause in McLaughlin and 
Loving, it did so as a means to ferret out laws enacted with the 
illicit motive of subordinating minorities.374 Because the 
Warren Court did not have the goal of second-guessing the 
legislative judgment on whether laws that benefited racial 
minorities were cost-justified, it did not import the 
“compelling interest” requirement into its racial classification 
cases.375 The compelling interest standard increases the 
 
371 Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1501. 
 372 Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1504. 
 373 Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 1504. 
 374 See supra text accompanying notes 320-24 (discussing 
the Warren Court’s racial discrimination cases between 1964 and 
1969). 
 375 Support for this observation may be found in John Ely’s 
explication of strict scrutiny in racial classification cases.  
Ely wrote during the transitional era when the Court had 
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importance of the state’s goal so much more than is necessary to 
police the state’s motive that it must be understood as a tool 
of cost-benefit analysis.376 
At least, that is how the Court has used it.  The 
compelling interest requirement in First Amendment litigation, 
and in the fundamental rights branch of equal protection has 
been used as a cost-justification metric.377 It was when the 
Burger and Rehnquist courts imported the compelling state 
interest standard into the Equal Protection Clause that the 
Court finally ruled that all racial classifications caused 
dignitary harms that were proscribed by the Equal Protection 
Clause.378 When the Burger and Rehnquist courts did that, they 
began employing strict scrutiny in racial classification cases 
not as a means to “smoke out” illicit motive, but as a means to 
declare that, on balance, the harm to whites was not worth the 
benefit to historically subordinated groups.379 The Supreme 
Court’s belated and controverted decision to impose the 
compelling state interest standard on affirmative action laws 
reflects its decision to shift the premises of the Equal 
 
imported narrow tailoring, but not the compelling interest 
requirement, into racial classification cases.  Ely, therefore, 
understood the purpose of strict scrutiny in racial 
classification cases as ensuring that the state had a proper 
motive.  Accordingly, he thought the state needed to show only 
that the law’s purpose was not so trivial that its assertion 
indicated a ruse.  See supra text accompanying notes 327-30 
(discussing Ely).  Concomitantly, he was one of the first 
prominent scholars to write in support of the constitutionality 
of affirmative action.  See John Ely, The Constitutionality of 
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 727, 741 
(1974).  Ely understood the Equal Protection Clause as 
effectuating an anti-racial-subordination, not an anti-racial-
classification, policy. 
 376 See supra text accompanying notes 327-30 (discussing 
Ely’s analysis of strict scrutiny). 
 377 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 182-88, 265-74 
(discussing Sherbert v. Verner and Shapiro v. Thompson). 
 378 City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
 379 See supra text accompanying note 291 (quoting Adarand 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995)). 
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Protection Clause from antisubordination to anticlassification 
theory.380 
Thus, the piecemeal migration of the branches of strict 
scrutiny into the Equal Protection Clause’s racial 
discrimination cases evidences an important transition in 
constitutional law.  As Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed, for 
good or for ill, “[t]he law is the witness and external deposit 
of our moral life.”381 
380 As Reva Siegel points out, the relaxed application of 
strict scrutiny in Grutter reflects a Court that, without 
emphasizing it, has trimmed its commitment to anticlassification 
as the Equal Protection Clause’s core value.  The outcome and 
some of the analysis in Grutter reflect a concern for the 
legislative betterment of subordinated minorities even if it 
means upholding government action that classifies citizens 
according to their race.  Siegel, Equality, supra note 23, at 
1538-43. 
 381 Oliver Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 
457, 459 (1897), repr. 110 id. at 991, 992 (1997). 
